It is worth mentioning that there are at least good reasons to reject nearly all of these theories (including physicalist and material thesis). Many aspects of each theories turn out to imply highly unintuitive effects. But I would recommend you read for yourself, since the mind-body problem is immense and very interesting at every step. The SEP articles on both of these[1][2] are quite good.
Elsewhere in this thread some have pointed out that the ontological assumptions of philosophers fade away as we approach the mind in our inquiry. This is at least partly because the mind stretches our understanding of knowledge and matter themselves, and to an even greater degree, our intuitions thereof.
[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/
[2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/; see especially §4.
The first related article linked from your link was "Humans cannot consciously generate random numbers sequences: Polemic study." (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17888582)
> 3. The classical computational theory of mind
> The label classical computational theory of mind (which we will abbreviate as CCTM) is now fairly standard.
> Turing computation is deterministic: total computational state determines subsequent computational state.
Astrology itself is not scientific but, if you use a version of it that's falsifiable, you absolutely can do a valid scientific study on it by making astrological predictions and then testing to see whether they come true. I think it's pretty widely agreed that we've already done this and the (valid scientific) result was negative.
This is beside the point. The point of contention is whether or not falsifiability is what makes science what it is, or should be. Genuine science (such as exploratory papers) very often does not start by specifying a falsifiable hypothesis. Bad science, such as astrology, does often propose falsifiable hypotheses. Therefore, astrology can be falsifiable. Therefore, according to Popperian demarcation, astrology counts as science, or it's scientific (useful to remember that Popper counted Darwinian evolution as non-science).
Falsifiability isn't enough for something to be science; it's not necessary and sufficient - because otherwise astrology is science, and exploratory research, popular in many scientific fields, isn't science. The fact that astrology's claims have been falsified does not discount it as science, since a great number of genuine scientific papers also successfully falsify their hypotheses - finding a null result is an example of falsifying a hypothesis.
There is plenty of useful work which doesn't specify a falsifiable hypothesis, but it's not science until it does so.
> Therefore, astrology can be falsifiable. Therefore, according to Popperian demarcation, astrology counts as science, or it's scientific
No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology can be a subject of scientific study. It doesn't make it science in and of itself.
Science is work that follows the scientific process: Choose a question to answer, formulate a hypothesis, make testable predictions based on the hypothesis, test the predictions, analyze and report the results. We can come with a new term (maybe 'pondering'?) for trying to answer questions without testing hypotheses, but by definition it won't be science.
That's quite a bold statement which is not supported by current work in the philosophy of science. Would you be willing to claim that most papers submitted to Nature don't count as science?
>No. Again, being falsifiable means that astrology can be a subject of scientific study. It doesn't make it science in and of itself.
The claim was that falsifiability is necessary and sufficient to count as science - so really we're in agreement. Making falsifiable claims is not necessary and sufficient demarcation of science and pseudo-science. You need something more than falsifiability to distinguish science from pseudo-science. The question is: what is that thing?
>but by definition it won't be science.
By whose definition? You're sending mixed messages - why is physics a science, rather than merely capable of being a subject of scientific study? We can make claims in physics that are just as falsifiable as the ones in astrology.
It's also unwise to paint an idealistic vision of science (falsificationism) in contrast to how it's actually practiced; from SEP:
>Popper’s focus on falsifications of theories led to a concentration on the rather rare instances when a whole theory is at stake. According to Kuhn, the way in which science works on such occasions cannot be used to characterize the entire scientific enterprise. Instead it is in “normal science”, the science that takes place between the unusual moments of scientific revolutions, that we find the characteristics by which science can be distinguished from other activities.
That's not entirely correct. We don't know that a Turing machine can have conscious experience. There's no substantiated "in principle" explanation for that.
Either way we certainly don't have any indication that it is impossible in principle for a Turing machine to perform the same kind of calculation that gives rise to conscious experience in humans, or that this calculation would for some (supernatural?) reason not have the same outcome if performed by something other than a human brain.
I do know that I have a conscious experience, so that's quite meaningful - to me. I cannot check that any other being has similar feelings, so the doubtful question would be whether "an X other than me can have conscious experience"; but people with good manners make the polite assumption that it's also true for other similar beings.
How would you write a computer program that "tells that story to itself," such that it actually has an experience of the world, as opposed to just being a machine executing a program without any conscious awareness?
Edit: also, whether we're in charge of our thoughts is a separate question from whether we possess consciousness. Even if we're not in charge of our thoughts, we still have a conscious experience of them.
In fact, there's pretty good evidence that what we call consciousness is a post-facto rationalization of the subconscious brain processes that determine an automatic answer of your brain to stimulus (not that it makes them deterministic, but certainly they're not "rational" in the classic sense).
A perception that, divorced from all other facts, entails a false conclusion.
So your perception of conscious subjectivity could indeed be an illusion.
Put another way, how would you program a computer to have a perception of conscious subjectivity, as opposed to just blindly and unconsciously executing its instructions?
No it doesn't! Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions, which is typically what is meant in philosophical discussions of this topic.
We have some mechanistic theories for consciousness [1]. It basically amounts to the same sort of illusion that your single core CPU uses to achieve the illusion of parallelism, ie. context switching between internal and external mental models produces the illusion of consciousness.
[1] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.0050...
I'd say that's an unfounded assumption, which doesn't come up in the argument you're responding to - even if it's somewhat 'popular' elsewhere.
The argument made is that consciousness is (or includes) a form of perception; not that this perception is independent of mechanistic components. With this definition, you assertion that 'conscious subjectivity is an illusion' is inconsistent, as an illusion is a complex form of perception that requires a consciousness to perceive it.
Following your CPU example, there is parallelism from the point of view of the program being executed, even if it's simulated from a single-core mechanical basis (threads and context-switching).
It's not really. Consciousness quite literally does not exist in mechanistic/eliminativist conceptions of consciousness like the link I provided, just like cars don't really exist because they aren't in the ontology of physics. My clarification of "assumption" is simply because many people don't know this.
> Following your CPU example, there is parallelism from the point of view of the program being executed, even if it's simulated from a single-core mechanical basis (threads and context-switching).
No, there is concurrency but not parallelism.
If I understand you correctly, that's a pretty harsh criterion for existence, isn't it? Even though a car is just a composite of metal atoms under a precise configuration and not a metaphysical entity on itself, you can still use it to drive you home. I suppose that makes me an utilitarian.
> No, there is concurrency but not parallelism.
You're right, my bad. I've forgotten my precision from my college days. Still, that's good enough for the program, just like my consciousness is good enough for me, even if it's entirely mechanistic and doesn't exist in the same way that cars don't exist.
If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck...
For example, I'm assuming you're conscious, because you posted a reply that was on-topic and coherent with the conversation above it.
To come back to the original claim:
> Simple: Find something that the brain does that could not, in principle, be emulated by a Turing machine or equivalent. So far we don't know of any such thing
We may not "know" of such a thing with certainty, but we have a strong candidate in consciousness.
There are two possibilities here:
One is that Turing machines are conscious (and we're monsters for what we do with them), in which case we still have an unexplained panpsychic phenomenon which we would need new science to understand.
The other is that Turing machines are not conscious, in which case there's an unexplained phenomenon in how an object like the brain can give rise to consciousness. In that case, the question of whether a Turing machine could in principle emulate consciousness depends on what the cause of consciousness is. It's certainly possible, and doesn't even seem particularly unlikely, that we find that Turing machines cannot do this, and that something other than "computation" is needed.
I don't have no reason or explanation that suggests that you have a consciousness either. You could be a very elaborate chatbot that posts coherent replies at online forums. Also, I do know whether I'm a chatbot myself or not, but you can't tell about me just from the replies written here.
> We may not "know" of such a thing with certainty, but we have a strong candidate in consciousness.
The problem with that is, you don't have a test for consciousness. There's a strong candidate in MRI brain scans (at least for humans), but you can't really be sure.