But even then, there are questions. Are math and logic made of physical stuff? What about causality or laws of nature? And what of universals or possible worlds or counterfactuals? If those exist, are they physical?
And then there's consciousness, and the ideas we have about the world, of which the study of physics is but one domain (containing concepts of energy, mass, fields, laws, information). Are these ideas physical?
What about the debate over the proper interpretation of quantum mechanics? Is that physical or philosophical? Is philosophy physics?
You quickly run into problems when you say that everything is domain X, because then you have to justify lumping everything into that category.
And the idea that everything is physics is open for debate, so clearly not everyone agrees that it is true by definition. Most things in philosophy don't get a free pass by virtue of definition, because people aren't going to usually agree to go along with said definition. Instead, they will want to ask what it means for everything to be physical.
As for your other points, I'm familiar with the debates on physicalism in their various forms. I just believe most of them are elaborate semantic games with very little actual content.
That people will ask what it means for everything (or anything) to be physical is precisely my point — stating that "information is physics" is a vague and (in my view) probably empty/tautological statement if you don't explain what you mean by that more precisely.
Those discussions might involve interesting physics, but it's certainly clouded in very poorly chosen and confusion-inducing terminology.