Keeping Memory Contents Secret

Re:Keeping Memory Contents Secret by saagarjha on Monday November 25, 2019 @04:57AM (#21626731)

Apparently MPX had a number of issues in general that made it worse than tools like Address Sanitizer: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.00719.pdf

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Re:Keeping Memory Contents Secret by pjmlp on Monday November 25, 2019 @05:48AM (#21626956)

I know, but then the path forward would be to fix it, instead of dropping it on the floor without any plan going forward.

After all, SPARC ADI is used in production, and ARM as well (partially with iOS, enforced in future Android devices).

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Re:Keeping Memory Contents Secret by saagarjha on Tuesday November 26, 2019 @05:00AM (#21636915)

What feature does iOS have that that is similar to this?

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Re:Keeping Memory Contents Secret by pjmlp on Wednesday November 27, 2019 @09:43AM (#21648198)

Pointer authentication and hardened runtime.

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Re:Keeping Memory Contents Secret by saagarjha on Wednesday November 27, 2019 @11:08AM (#21649046)

Those don’t really catch memory safety issues in the general case; they’re more focused on exploit mitigation.

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