Re:Deepfakes: MIT brings Nixon's Apollo disaster speech to life
by eyegor on Friday November 22, 2019 @01:25PM
(#21608378)
The only answer here is drm esque file signing. Any attempts at detecting fakes will only work while the tech is young. Ofc this requires a web of trust and verification techniques to be applied, since videos are often re encoded.
[ Parent
| on HN ]
Re:Deepfakes: MIT brings Nixon's Apollo disaster speech to life
by saalweachter on Friday November 22, 2019 @01:59PM
(#21608758)
Ok, I've signed my cellphone footage of a crime being committed. Now what? How does that prove my footage was taken where I said, when I said?
Re:Deepfakes: MIT brings Nixon's Apollo disaster speech to life
by eyegor on Friday November 22, 2019 @02:16PM
(#21608974)
I was thinking more along the lines of hardware manufacturers implementing a secure enclave style of signing files as they're recorded. The sig could be tagged with location/date if available, but at least the video would be verifiable. The web of trust would have to exist for reprocessors and media outlets who like to edit footage.
Re:Deepfakes: MIT brings Nixon's Apollo disaster speech to life
by jdietrich on Friday November 22, 2019 @02:40PM
(#21609232)
>at least the video would be verifiable
Nope, it'll just give well-executed fakes a veneer of legitimacy. A state-level actor will have easy access to the signing keys. Non-state-level actors could potentially extract them from a device or bribe an engineer at a third-tier Chinese OEM. A reasonably competent hardware hacker could desolder the CCD from a signed device and feed whatever video signal they like into it.