More importantly, there simply isn’t a reason why TOTP, a superior actually secure 2nd factor that doesn’t rely on a third party, can’t be offered, unless you want to force the user to cough up their phone number so you can track them.
Don’t even get me started on physical security keys. I could hardly even convince myself to use one, let alone always having at least one backup. Imagine asking my mom to do that.
At the end of the day, the average Joe needs a recovery mechanism that’s not tied to their memory and doesn’t make their everyday interactions a pita. Phone number is just one step below government IDs (which people would be uncomfortable to supply for most sites) and the challenge response could be easily automated, making it ideal. It’s being ruined because of the incompetence of telecom operators.
I wonder if requiring physical appearance with government ID for a SIM change, and making fraudulent SIM issuance a fireable offense would drastically cut down on SIM jacking. (Before anyone points it out, I do envision fraudsters applying for telecom jobs just to do this.)
Now, I’m not arguing TOTP without recovery phone number shouldn’t be an option. I opt into it whenever possible.
Well, I haven't seen a single person who wouldn't have one. We use them for cars and houses, though.
And credit/debit cards, I bet you have them too. It's a physical security key to the ATM. Classic 2FA spirit: something you have (the card) + something you know (PIN code).
The point is, people don't have problems with physical security keys. Programmers do (and hardware vendors) do, which means no standards and clunky UI.
Physical U2F keys get in the way of all-digital flows. They also need to interact with all kinds of non-dedicated devices, something they do a less than stellar job of. Bluetooth and NFC keys are young, setup process isn’t great and reliability seems to vary; USB keys require a USB port which might be occupied by other things or available only in another physically incompatible shape.
The keys aren't the problem, the engineers are. In this day and age, every device should have a digital keyhole (NFC, whatever) - and it should not take more than "insert or hold X next to Y".
Re: "physical process": something tells me you didn't type this message telepathically. UX is a physical process, and 99.99% of the time, it's doing something with your hands anyway. (Alexa/Siri/OK Google are a different beast).
If every other phone can have a fingerprint scanner, it can have something for actual keys too.
Moreover, imagine this: your devices could have built-in hardware keys that you can register with your bank/etc should you desire that convenience.
Still proper 2FA: your phone number is just an account, which is at the whim of your service provider, but your device is something you have.
It's a bit of an "eggs in one basket" situation, but given that people tend to use the same password everywhere, I see it as strictly a step up since it's much less likely for your password manager to be compromised (targeted attack in most cases) than for a site to be hacked.
Once everyone is using password managers consistently, then we can start to talk about TOTP and other 2FA tools, and at first only use it to secure the password manager.
Once we solve the password manager problem, most other problems go away. You don't need to reset passwords if you have it in your password database (your computer won't forget it). You don't have to come up with passwords that match some arbitrary set of requirements, you let your computer do that. If you get recovery codes, stick them next to your passwords in your password manager. If there's a breach, your password manager can likely tell you which accounts are affected, and you can just change those instead of every site that you use that password on.
So yeah, 2FA is nice, but improving how people use the first factor is far more important and actually makes peoples' lives easier.
Just because the second factor can be compromised, doesn't make it useless. Pretty much any security mechanism can be breached, it's all about increasing the difficulty of an attack until it matches the value of what you are trying to protect. SMS 2FA protects you against untargeted attacks like credential stuffing, which is probably sufficient for 95% of people.
You must have not followed any SIM-jacking story, which is the point of this entire thread.
1. They don’t need your password because their goal is a password reset through your recovery phone, or recovery email address “secured” by a recovery phone.
2. They do social engineering on telecom employees (or outright buy them out for a pittance) to not only get access to your messages, but take over your entire link to your cellular network. You’re not involved in any of this.
TL;DR: the second factor makes you less secure, not more. It’s a downgrade from a secure password. It makes you defenseless.
Breakable != useless.
(The other use of SMS which is somewhat legitimate is as a cost gate to create new accounts. Generally creating a new SMS receiving phone number costs someone more than a new email, so if you want to crudely limit creation of large numbers of accounts by individual users, it can be an option.)
It's not about your password. It's about social engineering. Bad guys call their buddies at some mobile phone co. and get your number switched for a few minutes, then they call your bank and get them to change your password which they do because they trust SMS 2FA which now goes to the bad guys, and then they take your money, and you find out much later. Password quality has zero to do with any of this.