News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Don’t Rush Quantum-Proof Encryption, Warns NSA Research D... by throw0101a on Thursday November 21, 2019 @01:34PM (#21597625)
> In reality even protocols like TLS that are nominally agile advance primarily by versioning, not agility

In the last ten years we've been able to disable CBC-based ciphers to protect against POODLE and BEAST, and disable RC4 to protect against Bar-mitzvah and NOMORE, all the while a legacy device could stick with TLS 1.0 without any code changes. All that was necessary was to tweak the cipher preferences.

Being able to support both AES and ChaCha20 is a good thing, and when AESng/Mambo40 come along it will be easier to add them to the protocol in a rolling fashion IMHO.

Re:Don’t Rush Quantum-Proof Encryption, Warns NSA Research D... by morelisp on Saturday November 23, 2019 @12:50PM (#21615365)
If that TLS 1.0 device had never needed to support RC4 in TLS to begin with, which practically speaking it never really needed to, we could've done less work at implementation time, provided clearer guidance to users when the vulnerabilities were discovered, and likely had fewer affected users to begin with.
Re:Don’t Rush Quantum-Proof Encryption, Warns NSA Research D... by throw0101a on Monday November 25, 2019 @04:46PM (#21633160)
> If that TLS 1.0 device had never needed to support RC4 in TLS to begin with, which practically speaking it never really needed to ...

Except that we did not know about not needing to. When BEAST came out a lot of recommendations said to switch over to RC4:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#BEAST...