The big issue here is that this observation doesn't break the premise of the article. It remains true that we don't know enough about how real-world quantum computers, if they ever exist at scales useful to attack cryptography, will work.
In the last ten years we've been able to disable CBC-based ciphers to protect against POODLE and BEAST, and disable RC4 to protect against Bar-mitzvah and NOMORE, all the while a legacy device could stick with TLS 1.0 without any code changes. All that was necessary was to tweak the cipher preferences.
Being able to support both AES and ChaCha20 is a good thing, and when AESng/Mambo40 come along it will be easier to add them to the protocol in a rolling fashion IMHO.
Except that we did not know about not needing to. When BEAST came out a lot of recommendations said to switch over to RC4:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#BEAST...