Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches
by libeclipse on Monday November 18, 2019 @04:35PM
(#21568358)
With BTI can the attacker not just write a BTI opcode to the start of the jump location? Usually you would jump to a buffer that you control the contents of (i.e. shellcode)
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches
by pcwalton on Monday November 18, 2019 @04:41PM
(#21568409)
W^X prevents that straightforward attack, by not allowing writable buffers to be executed. The typical way to defeat W^X is ROP chains with gadgets consisting of pieces of code already present in the binary. BTI, in turn, is a defense against that.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches
by saagarjha on Monday November 18, 2019 @07:42PM
(#21569739)
I’m not convinced their search for ROP gadgets in libc is useful; often there’s a “magic” address that will do all the work to directly execve /bin/sh if you jump there (in glibc, this is inside of do_system).
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches
by monocasa on Monday November 18, 2019 @07:03PM
(#21569468)
I'm not convinced that a conditional branch to the ret followed by breakpoints between it and the ret is enough to remove the usefulness of the gadget as much as they say.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches
by saagarjha on Tuesday November 19, 2019 @12:59AM
(#21570948)
I mean, that's really been their job every time a new mitigation is developed…the introduction of NX led to the use of ROP, which has been joined by JOP techniques as efforts to remove return gadgets gain momentum.
It's very much a cat and mouse game.
The real end game here is memory safety.
Note: As described later in the presentation, those 46 remaining gadgets are in the boot code, which is erased after booting.
Harvard Architecture?
Data-only attacks do exist (and are bound to become a lot more common).