News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by libeclipse on Monday November 18, 2019 @04:35PM (#21568358)
With BTI can the attacker not just write a BTI opcode to the start of the jump location? Usually you would jump to a buffer that you control the contents of (i.e. shellcode)
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by pcwalton on Monday November 18, 2019 @04:41PM (#21568409)
W^X prevents that straightforward attack, by not allowing writable buffers to be executed. The typical way to defeat W^X is ROP chains with gadgets consisting of pieces of code already present in the binary. BTI, in turn, is a defense against that.

It's very much a cat and mouse game.

Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by monocasa on Monday November 18, 2019 @05:19PM (#21568746)
So now we're going to see the next step be making gadgets out of code fragments that happen to begin with BTI.

The real end game here is memory safety.

Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by wahern on Monday November 18, 2019 @06:58PM (#21569433)
There are ways to compile that elide ROP gadgets. It's easier on architectures like ARM than x86. OpenBSD has taken this approach:

   Number of ROP gadgets in 6.3-release arm64 kernel
     69935
   Number of ROP gadgets in 6.4-beta arm64 kernel
     46
https://www.openbsd.org/papers/eurobsdcon2018-rop.pdf

Note: As described later in the presentation, those 46 remaining gadgets are in the boot code, which is erased after booting.

Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by saagarjha on Monday November 18, 2019 @07:42PM (#21569739)
I’m not convinced their search for ROP gadgets in libc is useful; often there’s a “magic” address that will do all the work to directly execve /bin/sh if you jump there (in glibc, this is inside of do_system).
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by monocasa on Monday November 18, 2019 @07:03PM (#21569468)
I'm not convinced that a conditional branch to the ret followed by breakpoints between it and the ret is enough to remove the usefulness of the gadget as much as they say.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by saagarjha on Monday November 18, 2019 @07:43PM (#21569742)
Why?
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by monocasa on Monday November 18, 2019 @10:39PM (#21570468)
It's exactly the kind of roadblock that people who do offensive security are great at finding loopholes around.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by saagarjha on Tuesday November 19, 2019 @12:59AM (#21570948)
I mean, that's really been their job every time a new mitigation is developed…the introduction of NX led to the use of ROP, which has been joined by JOP techniques as efforts to remove return gadgets gain momentum.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by monocasa on Tuesday November 19, 2019 @12:47PM (#21575812)
This is more like fitting shellcode into something that can be strcpyed. Not really that much of a complication from an attack perspective.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by saagarjha on Monday November 18, 2019 @05:26PM (#21568809)
That's where pointer authentication can help.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by qubex on Tuesday November 19, 2019 @05:51AM (#21571945)
> memory safety

Harvard Architecture?

Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by monocasa on Tuesday November 19, 2019 @01:00PM (#21575987)
Or a language that doesn't let you overflow buffers.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by armitron on Monday November 18, 2019 @05:23PM (#21568779)
No real end game I'm afraid.

Data-only attacks do exist (and are bound to become a lot more common).

Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by monocasa on Monday November 18, 2019 @05:26PM (#21568816)
End game for the class of remote code execution vulnerabilities.
Re:Some near-term arm64 hardening patches by armitron on Monday November 18, 2019 @05:22PM (#21568773)
That hasn't been true in a very long time.