Re:The Case Against Boeing
by hansthehorse on Saturday November 16, 2019 @12:18PM
(#21553697)
As an example American nuclear control room crews are given 20 hours of simulator training with an exam every six weeks. Fail and they are taken off shift for extra training and given another exam. How often are airline pilots given emergency procedure simulator training?
At United Airlines, every six months.
Re:The Case Against Boeing
by goatinaboat on Saturday November 16, 2019 @06:59AM
(#21552220)
the flight crews are supposed to follow their training
They did follow their training. Unfortunately they had been trained to fly something that was actually a completely different plane.
Re:The Case Against Boeing
by WalterBright on Saturday November 16, 2019 @07:06AM
(#21552250)
> They did follow their training.
Nope.
The MCAS had too much authority , Boeing give it extra functionality that was not initially designed for, this are facts that were revealed so far , I am not sure if you are trying to shift the blame to the pilots or only argue that they could have saved the plane despite Boeing fault.
All the facts revealed so far from the investigation show that the plane was rushed and things that could have improved safety like training and warring lights were omitted because of money.
They did. Just that the training manuals were inadequate. Part of Boeing trying to grandfather the MAX as a normal 737. Issuing comprehensive training plans would have gone against that claim. Os they didn't. And pilots flew a plane they had every reason to believe to behave like any other 737 out there. But which didn't.
Re:The Case Against Boeing
by atdrummond on Saturday November 16, 2019 @12:36PM
(#21553807)
Walter is right here. This procedure is the same (and not just for the 737 airframe family). Even though the cutout switches changed function (and this is the main area I actually fault Boeing on), if the flights had executed the cutout properly after the needed adjustments, they could have stabilized.
Source: my former business ran heavy check maintenance software for most of the world's largest airines.
Does it really help so if the procedure is the same but the critical element, the cut-off switch changed function? I'd say no, in that case procedure had changed. If it would have just been some kind of human error, like Air France 447, it wouldn't have grounded the whole fleet for the time being.
Re:The Case Against Boeing
by atdrummond on Saturday November 16, 2019 @12:58PM
(#21553949)
It didn't change in a way that would have not stabilized the plane.
What it did do is remove granularity (again, not sure why, as the 737NG setup is perfectly fine) in the options available to the pilot. Regardless, the SOP on using the cutout switches did not change.
Because the stabilizer trim was running away.
Emergencies can happen in any stage of the flight, and the flight crews are supposed to follow their training.
For example, sometimes an engine catches fire. This is never supposed to happen. But the pilots are trained to deal with it. Probably 90% of pilot training is learning to deal with problems that shouldn't happen.