Navies are big, expensive things to build and maintain, and as such, they are usually designed and planned around various assumptions of potential future war scenarios. Were Britain and France friendly, or even in a union such as the Angevin Empire, their resulting navy would likely be much smaller than the combined sizes of their historical navy, since it would be pointless to maintain a navy of that size if no feasible set of combatants could challenge it.
It is also worth pointing out that large countries that manage to steamroll their opposition and establish an unparalleled hegemony tend to result in the creation of other countries that can challenge their ascendancy: the Mongol Empire creating the Russian Empire in this way is perhaps the best example.
Also, the original question was specific - was France the only credible major power to assist US? It is silly to answer it by speculating backwards, about events that may or may not have happened centuries prior to it.
More to the point if George III had wanted to recover the lost colonies as much as he was anti catholic - the war of 1812 might well gone very differently.
> The expanded French fleet, in combination with the Spanish, outnumbered the British one and was able to temporarily gain sufficient command of the Atlantic to prevent Lord Cornwallis and a large British army, besieged by George Washington and 5,800 French regulars at Yorktown on the Chesapeake Bay in 1781, from being evacuated or reinforced by sea, forcing Cornwallis to surrender. This was the decisive battle of the war that ended with the Peace of Paris in 1783. Washington himself handsomely acknowledged the significance of the French contribution in a letter to Admiral De Grasse in which he said, “You will have observed that whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the present contest” (Lloyd 1965, p. 174). The Canadian historian W. J. Eccles (1987, p. 153) is even more explicit: “French initiative, French tactics, French ships, French guns and men achieved that unexpected and decisive victory. The Americans could not have done it on their own.”
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> The war also had very severe consequences for France’s much more disorderly fiscal system, where the finance minister Calonne and his predecessor Necker together borrowed over 900 million livres in the decade from 1777 to 1787 (Doyle 1988, pp. 43– 52). The situation was so bad that Calonne informed Louis XVI that no fiscal remedies could be found without a complete overhaul of the society and administrative system of the ancien régime, leading to the summoning of the Estates-General in 1789 and the outbreak of the French Revolution.
Power and Plenty, Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke