The highest required factor of safety in engineering is AFAIK 5 and is used for things like lifts, cablecars and similar.
But the short version of the story is that for LRFD there are two main factors which affect “factor of safety” in the traditional sense (eg - structural capacity / structural demand) which are load factors and resistance factors (as you’d guess). Load factors increase applied forces while resistance factors decrease assumed strengths. Load factors vary depending on the type of load but typically they’re between 1.2 to 1.6. Resistance factors vary based on failure mechanism under consideration and are between 0.6 to 0.9 for structural work.
So the range is 1.2/0.9 to 1.6/0.6 or ~1.35 to ~2.75.
There are secondary sources of additional factors of safety. For example, material properties assumed in design are the minimums that are allowed and so chances are you’ll get something on site that exceeds by 25-50% or so because nobody wants to deliver material that doesn’t meet the minimums and open themselves to claims liability. There’s also a redundancy factor which is touched on in the report where loads are increased if no redundant load path exists, for concrete there’s some additional caps/limitations on a couple values due to time effects like creep, etc.
I would say most modern construction has an overall factor of safety of 3-5 with bleeding edge construction sitting at around 2 and public works construction (utilities or highways - things where architects aren’t involved) at over 5.
It is a small (but good) thing, though it would have IMHO not been enough to save this particular bridge, here the issue is evidently a wrong static model, or - less likely - a wrong assessment of loads.
Besides the initial (huge) calculation error, what is really preoccupying is that they didn't consider as serious the cracks, which as seen in the video/photos on youtube are the typical (severe) shear cracks, that should have been ringing all alarms.
The poor structure, as often happens, did all it could to "signal" the issue, what I find bordering being criminal is ignoring or severely underestimating those clear signals.
I suspect current designs are far nearer critical tolerances. Even under the ridiculous dynamics of the Tacoma Narrows incident, ultimate failure took hours.
It took 4 months from construction to failure, during which time it was already flexing far more than normal.
Contrast Tacoma Narrows, whose final throes were long enough for crowds to form and traffic to be cleared.
Tacoma:
https://youtube.com/watch?v=mXTSnZgrfxM
FIU:
https://youtube.com/watch?v=BSq8295GFk4
Nanfang'ao:
https://youtube.com/watch?v=mjsZbbG5fag
Morandi, Genoa, Italy:
https://youtube.com/watch?v=_gEMep8xLHk
I-35W, Minneapolis, MN:
https://hn.algolia.com/?query=bridge%20that%20barely%20stand...