Arguments against IRV do not apply to SV/RV or AV. IRV and FPTP fall prey to shenanigans via Arrow's Impossibility Theorem because they require candidates to be ranked relative to one another (or you just pick the best one as in FPTP). Once they do not need to be ranked (as in two candidates can get the same vote from a given voter), then none of the Arrow problems apply.
SV and AV are also simple to explain, work well and can be hand-counted. And they don't have the huge problem that IRV and other ranked voting mechanisms have.
It's very easy. Australia regularly does it with millions of ballots.
Step one: you count the ballots by hand.
Phew, what an exhaustive list of instructions!
So you either have the communication between every round (which is essentially re-counting) or you physically take all the ballots to a central counting location, which introduces delays and chain of custody issue.
Also, IRV leads to more spoiled ballots. http://scorevoting.net/SPRates.html
So while there are more important reasons to prefer Score Voting and Approval Voting (better outcomes, better resistance to strategy, etc.), complexity is certainly not a non-issue.
As for chain of custody, again, Australia has solved this problem. Every box is numbered, every seal on the box is numbered. All of them are signed out by electoral officials, witnessed by at least two scrutineers from different candidates. When the boxes are opened this process is repeated.
Do you know how many times ballot boxes have gone missing in an Australian election? Once. In a century. Once. For which the High Court voided the election because there was a minute but non-zero chance that the outcome would've been affected. It was re-run from scratch.
Furthermore, doesn't Australia use it only for House elections where you don't have to compute across a particularly large population?
Your tone is rather dismissive here.
My tone is dismissive because I am tired of being told IRV is "too complex" or "won't work". Because it's simple and it has scaled flawlessly for decades. You just need to believe the experience of other countries is more valid than a theory.
But, I'm with you that IRV is workable (there's ample evidence) and better than the abomination that FPTP is. I guess my point is that AV/SV address these concerns through their simplicity (I find both of them less complex than IRV in both voter UX and result computation) and also that they avoid the unintuitive problems mentioned in the OP ncase link, which can potentially be even worse than the problems of FPTP simply because they are hard for even educated voters to wrap their heads around, whereas the problems of FPTP (vote splitting) are easier to explain (but still bad. this isn't a defense of fptp).
[Some practical requirements for/questions about a voting method:
* Does it always have a winner?
* Can the resulting winner always enjoy public legitimacy?
* Is the voting system simple enough for the public to understand?
* Can it map to useful public choices?
* Is it susceptible to cheating?
* Does it bias towards the center or not? (Note that some people might prefer biasing and some not).
* Can voters signal to politicians they must change course? ]
It is objectively one of the simplest voting methods based on summability, rates of spoiled ballots, speed it takes the average voter to complete a ballot, etc.
However it is called, there are many reasons for why it is so bad, but they all boil to one point: it's asking voters for information they do not have while ignoring the human realities of the vote. As we code monkeys say: GIGO.
99% of humanity doesn't have a 'Score' for politicians* , but the reality of the vote is that whatever choice the voter has, the voter can push effectively by giving min/max scores - or at least is very likely to think it can be helpful, and feel guilty when they don't do it - imagine losing an election because you merely gave your preferred candidate an 8!
A Range Voting election where everyone gives min/max scores de facto may look mathematically identical to Approval Voting, but it is far worse in reality.
That's because voters will then convince themselves their choice is deserved - their politician is a 10 and the other is a 0, an enemy. The problem in other words is that voters will mostly not partially abstain, but be pushed into a false polarization beyond what is useful for society. Psychology, not math.
There are other points, but this message is long enough. TL;DR: "Score" voting is the triumph of mathematically optimized voting methods that ignores too many human considerations.
But look, I am willing to go half way: Approval voting is a perfectly good method and I can accept Borda. Both are strictly better than the current method even according to the weird measurement "The Center for Range Voting" uses. Approval can even be seen as a (sane) version of RV, so there's no reason at all for the center to object.
* Oh, and the 1% who actually has a score? That's almost worse, because these scores are nearly always the compilation of single issue organizations which tend towards the extremes and never look at circumstances.
This is not a hypothetical concern, something like this has already occurred in Australian politics. Queensland switched from exhaustive preferential (IRV where all candidates must be ranked) to optional preferential (1-n candidates may be ranked) and then ran "just vote 1" as their campaign slogan. In doing so they obliterated the centre-right and further-right parties that traditionally operate as a coalition in Parliament.
Relying on voters to be aware of the mathematics of a voting system and on candidates to represent those honestly is problematic. IRV is simple to explain, works well enough and can be efficiently hand-counted.