[0] https://bolson.org/~bolson/2009/20090303_burlington_vt_mayor...
[1] http://www.fairvote.org/why-the-condorcet-criterion-is-less-...
[2] https://www.starvoting.us/
[4] https://www.electionscience.org/library/approval-voting/
I'm not sure if or why people might feel more satisfied casting their votes as a partial ranking versus as a binary approval. But it seems like STAR works great for the former group, approval for the latter.
For instance - in a 99-voter election, say that 50 voters prefer A, and 49 prefer B. But the A supporters are lukewarm in their support, while B supporters are really passionate. Who should win? For democratic elections, that answer always needs to be A.
addendum: if a candidate has broad, but shallow support, they'd not make it in FPTP nor in RCV. Even so, it'd be great if we could have visualization tools /w STAR voting included so that we could point to specific examples and have fun arguments about them. Perhaps there are some very weird discontinuities in STAR voting as well.
It gets weird making the 0s and 5s, and the 1s and 4s fight I feel. Since those are just ultra polarized candidates.
It depends what we want to optimize for, but I think most people would agree that we want to avoid having a very large number of absolutely discontent voters. So I think a system which either makes the least hated candidate win (even if no ones favorite), or makes an overwhelming favorite win, is what we'd want. That way we minimize the number of people who are absolutely disgruntled.
If the least hated candidate wins, I worry that they would lack the mandate to get anything done. I'm not sure if that's a good thing or a bad thing.
In fact, I'd expect less opposition, since more people approved of their proposed platform.
The chart at the bottom demonstrating the range of "Bayesian regret" caught my eye when I first started looking into all of this 3 years ago. It roughly measures aggregate societal satisfaction with respect to the result of the election versus their own preferences. Strategic ballots in approval voting reduce to FPTP -- there's not really much room for a concerted effort to sway an election one way or another, since this strategy will be shared by large swaths of each candidate's voter base and so is roughly negligible. And people will feel that "their voice is heard" which I strongly encourage as political engagement is contingent on feeling like it's worth it.
Approval voting, on the other hand, always allows people to show support to a third-party candidate without risking throwing away their vote....
Ordinal systems impose a strict rank on peoples' choices, whereas cardinal systems allow people to settle on superpositions of choices, to explicitly give up control.
To me, being forced to order my choices is an unfair imposition. I want to be able to say "I'd be okay with fish or vegan food, someone else who cares more should make the final call". I don't want Rob Richie telling me that I should vote for fish over vegan food because I happen to really like fish. In doing that, I'd be alienating my vegan friend, and because I'm totally up for eating vegan food, I find it unacceptable to be pressured into ranking one over the other. This is the very dynamic that creates splitting, and I'm offended by it.
Being forced to rank my choices is unnatural to me, but I've heard ordinal voting advocates claim that ranking choices is natural and intuitive to everyone/most people, even after sharing my position that it feels funny. Go figure.
I'd expect ordinal voting advocates to be more likely to agree with statements like "everyone has a favorite color".
You can give multiple people the same rank, to express no preference between them. So you could have two or more choices you don't want to express an opinion between both marked 1, then perhaps the lesser but still acceptable candidates marked 2, the unacceptable candidates as 3, and extremely unacceptable candidates as 4.
Meanwhile, somebody else can come along and rank all the candidates with a unique number if they prefer.
In Schulze, all the numbering is doing is expressing who you would pick in a one-on-one race any pair of candidates.
Ranking candidates the same (tied), simply means you would have left that question blank on a traditional FPTP ballot because you don't care which of the two wins, either because you find them equally good/bad or you feel they sufficiently close that you would prefer to let those who care more decide.
For example, I don't own a home, or have kids, so i will usually leave school property tax levy questions blank. I may have some super slight preference one way or another, but I'm mostly unaffected, so I will let those who actually care about this decide.
https://www.fairvote.org/how_ranked_choice_voting_survives_t...
https://www.fairvote.org/_ranked_choice_voting_reaffirmed_in...
That is part of what was at stake in the 2016 US Presidential election. Both sides were deeply divided, but one side decided to pull behind its candidate despite that, and the other one was still at odds with itself. The third candidate wasn't on the ballot, but his supporters were still carping from the sidelines. That would have been even louder had he actually been on the ballot. It's possible that some alternative system would have brought out enough additional voters to put one or the other over the top*, but it seems at least as likely that they'd develop even more bad blood in public.
You could explain to them that an approval or second choice for their semi-aligned opponent would leave them better off, but the longer they continued to fight, the more likely they'd just consider each other enemies rather than friends. Either way, their opponents who came behind their candidate would have an easier time attacking both at once.
My point isn't that the alternative systems are bad, but that in the end every election has exactly one winner, and that winner will always represent a coalition since people never see exactly eye to eye. They have to work out the rules of that compromise at some point, and the advantage of FPTP is that they get to do so among themselves rather than mixing it in with the broader contest. Those who do so will find themselves at an advantage regardless of the system.
[0] And yeah, that's made even more complex by the weird double-aggregation system they have going on, but that's a somewhat separate issue.
A much simpler method in my opinion is approval voting: the ballot instructs, "Who do you think would perform the duties of the office to your approval? Check all names that apply." Then whoever gets the most checkmarks in aggregate is the winner. No spoiler effect, easily-understood vote tallying system, and reflects true approval in the population of voters. It can be adapted to multi-seat races just by taking the top n winners.
Ka-Ping Yee simulated elections using a number of recognized methods for counting votes[1]. I believe that the best system will be one which is easily-understood at the ballot box and behaves as similarly to the Condorcet method as possible. According to these simulations, it appears that approval voting is the best.
No election method will meet all the requirements for an ideal one[2] so it comes down to which conditions you want to enforce and which are less important. IMO, monotonicity is very important while the later-no-harm criterion can be interpreted as a compromise which is necessary for strategic voting.
[1] http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theore...