If you can't trust your device, you can't trust it without DoH either. As I said upthread, devices don't even need to use DNS. They can open up encrypted C&C channels, using whatever protocol they'd like, tunneled over whatever they'd like. They can bake rendezvous IP addresses in, they can cryptographically verify endpoints to break MITM proxies, they can even sneak data out in ICMP packets. DoH has literally nothing to do with it.
What's insidious about this argument is that it preys on peoples legitimate concerns about uncontrolled devices on their network. We're all concerned about that! But that doesn't mean we should use plaintext DNS, or Paul Vixie's preferred "encrypted DNS with a killswitch for network operators".
Might as well argue against using windmills to grind wheat.
Sometimes you don't choose the software, the software chooses you:
* https://www.zdnet.com/article/first-ever-malware-strain-spot...
* https://www.zdnet.com/article/psixbot-malware-upgraded-with-...
I'm happy to implement DoT on work's network to help encourage encrypted DNS. My problem is DoH can now be used by all sorts garbage and we can't tell it from legitimate HTTPS--which is by design.
All this for the laudable goal of protecting Internet surfers' privacy. However I'm curious to know how well this will work against the Great Firewall of China, and how many other regimes will now implement Great Firewalls of their own.
Malware can ship with an arbitrary number of DNS-over-HTTPS servers accessible anyway, no matter whether Google supports it. The cat was out of the bag as soon as you allowed encryption on your network in general.
Finally, there are system architectures that are inherently less susceptible to malware, which is what we should really be focusing on. If your document viewer doesn't need to access the Internet, why does it have access to the Internet? Why does your general-web-browsing browser have access to your intranet and worse, your network drives and USB sticks? The reason we're stuck with what we have now is that operating systems research largely died in the 90s, but we're now aware that e.g. microkernel capability systems can be implemented in ways that are both fast and secure.
[1] https://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/scramblesuit/wpes2013.pdf
Expect “enterprise” network equipment using an approach like this to provide a “DOH firewall” in the near future.
Net privacy gained: negative.
The goal for DoH is to improve privacy for individual humans, and it does that.
Except when the client ignores what you tell it. Per Paul Vixie:
* https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19170671Of course with DoH you can't just do a UDP redirect. With DoT, which uses tcp/953, you can at least block access.
But with DoH, you have just lost control of your network. (Unless block 443 and force everything to go through a (Squid) proxy?)