A property of bitwise xoring random variable `x` with a constant (or otherwise non-random but independent) value is that the entropy of `x` is preserved in the result.
0 is as random a number as 529890873740477 is.
This is well outside of my wheelhouse, so please pardon a naive inquiry.
Whether tsc clock and timer clock are linked or not is completely irrelevant, since the timer clock is only used to 1) credit entropy 2) possibly introduce additional jitter. The value of TSC when the timer interrupt runs is not used as entropy at all so even if that were 100% predictable, it doesn't matter.
It only matters that you do have jitter (between calls to schedule() and random_get_entropy()), and I have a hard time imagining a modern system with a high-res TSC where calling schedule() with active timers in a loop (with branches) would not have any jitter at all. You probably have way more entropy than one bit per jiffy; I think the counter is very conservative.
Notice that while entropy is credited only once per tick, actual TSC values are mixed into the entropy pool on every iteration of the loop that calls schedule().
How safe is it to use CPU jitter in a virtual machine?
Like HN users will gladly spend hours discussing the merits of various random number generation schemes, why that Intel HWRNG is probably backdoored and we should all be very afraid, all the while running their micro-services on the cloud where their entropy is literally spoon-fed from the hypervisor. SMC call into code-you-can't-see and back comes pure entropy (trust us)!
> but mixing entropy from the hardware with other sources is considered to be safe by most, even if the hardware generator is somehow suspect.
To be clear, it's a property of bitwise xor that it preserves entropy. If you xor a random bit with 1 you still have a random bit.