That's what makes extortion work. If the cost to avoid damage is on par with the potential damage, few if any victims would actually pay the criminal. The extorted amount being a fraction of the potential damage makes victims more willing to pay.
This is marketing for CIO/CISO's to read so they make sure to add in various security features to their BoM for purchase.
You can't trust everything coming from companies at face value. That doesn't mean you shouldn't trust anything.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Atlanta_cyberattack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Baltimore_ransomware_atta...
The other part of it appears to be some slightly funny calculations. If ransomware shuts down Target's online store for a day, Target might compute the loss based on 24 hours of no revenue, but purchases that go to Amazon, or to Target a day later, shouldn't be added into total "damage". The dollar value being computed there is something more like disruption.
The report is from 2017, and relies on a 300% increase in the rate of ransomware to get that 2019 cost. That sounds high, but apparently the 2016 rate did triple in that much time (although the WannaCry spike drove a bunch of that).
On the other hand, it appears to be assuming 300% growth in attacks with a a constant rate of victimization. This doesn't make much sense alongside stats like "In 2016, an average of 40 percent of spam emails contained malware links to ransomware, an increase of 6,000 percent over 2015, when less than one percent contained ransomware." That's a qualitative change from "not a threat" to "threat", and presumably 40% -> 80% would not double attack success rates.
Further, the damage stat attempts to include subjective costs like employee training and reputational harm, as well as a naive calculation of revenue costs which assumes no revenue lost to donwtime will be recovered post-attack. That's a fairly reasonable corporate estimate, but summing it across all victims this way isn't valid at all. Only a fraction of that balance-sheet loss is actual GDP-shrinking damage, while the rest becomes either loss to competitors or value-creating OpEx like security and training investment.
Hilariously, one of the linked Cybersecurity Ventures writeups also claims[1] that "cybercrime will cost the world in excess of $6 trillion annually by 2021, making it more profitable than the global trade of all major illegal drugs combined". It's amazing what kind of numbers you can invent when you compare the societal cost of one crime to the net profit of another. As much as I love William Gibson, I don't think the cartels will be swapping their chemists for programmers within the next two years.
[1] https://blogs.cisco.com/financialservices/ransomware-lessons...