The Langewiesche legacy goes back to his father Wolfgang Langewiesche, who is also a terrific writer, incidentally about probably still the best book about flying fixed wings, Stick and Rudder (1936).
But flying has moved on a lot since then. Although I also appreciate "The story of Mel", computing has moved on so far from moving some bits and bytes on a drum memory, that I absolutely prefer someone writing readable code today to someone who produces unreadable, but performant code (spare a few niches of inner loop optimization).
The same goes for flying back now and then. When there's not just "Stick and Rudder" in a modern airplane, but caring for massively diverse aspects such as ATC, passenger air quality, airspace control or fuel optimization, I don't need specialists. I need competent generalists.
Of course it makes for a nice hero story if a pilot just makes it to the runway because they took an airliner into a forward slip like the Gimli Glider, but the point is that they absolutely should not have to.
Humans are not meant for sensing to fly. The average VFR pilot loses not just orientation, but control over the airplane an average of around 178 seconds (!) after going into a cloud.
We need less heroes and more engineers who can build reliable automated safety systems.
VFR is Visual Flight Rules, meaning the pilot's training and the paperwork qualifying them to fly is only for when you can see where you're going. The other case is IFR Instrument Flight Rules, which means you need to learn to ignore your brain's guess as to where it is and how it's moving and trust the (redundant but not necessarily infallible) instruments to tell you what's happening. You still look outside the plane, because there might be something important to see (e.g. geese!) but you mostly are scanning your instruments, seeking confirmation that everything continues to be good, the instruments don't disagree with each other or with the pilot's understanding of what's supposed to be happening.
VFR qualified pilots are not supposed to go near clouds at all. The exact distances vary depending on where the plane is exactly (low, slow flying planes get to be closer than higher, fast moving planes) but the general principle is that you need to stay so far from all clouds that you can easily see anything coming out of a cloud and avoid it entirely, since under VFR you are relying primarily on what you can see. Unfortunately they sometimes stray into clouds, and 178 seconds isn't very long.
Obviously the people flying a Max will all be IFR qualified (the commercial pilot licensing doesn't have a VFR option) but the parent's point is true anyway - we are already training pilots not to try to fly by instinct because humans do not have appropriate instincts for flying, we are earthbound.
And I think we’ve already reached that point in aviation, as much of the work has been offloaded to automated systems, making it easy for attention to doze elsewhere, and making transitions to where manual intervention is unexpectedly required even more difficult. It’s the same with self driving cars: the only safe options seem to be no automation and all automation since humans simply don’t do boring very well.
Yes, we want flying to be as boring as possible, and yes making flying this boring has been the result of the amazing success of making flying safe.
Yes, with flying so boring, when something exciting does happen it's in many senses more of a problem.
This is a, maybe the fundamental dilemma in aviation safety today. Part of the solution is lots and lots of simulator training. Which of course is a problem when the manufacturer claims that there is no need for simulator training, because everything is exactly the same.
Flying is becoming less like flying a bus and more like supervising an automated train, and that is what is dangerous. When something unusual happens, the pilots are surprised and unable to adjust quickly, because unusual isn’t usual.
Of course, if unusual happens all the time, or is too out of the norm, you are pretty screwed, exciting is more dangerous than boring, but it doesn’t make boring less dangerous.
If there is a lack of manual flying ability it is entirely due to culture and not the aircraft. Pilots can and do turn off the autopilot if they want to practice, and most landings are done manually because it is softer.
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-...
Statistically the most common cause of car crashes is driver fatigue.
Forcing undivided attention toward a boring subject for prolonged periods always results in cognitive fatigue.
I guarantee fatigue would be a similarly common occurrence in plane crashes caused by pilot error.
Either our planes should be flying themselves, or our pilots should be given cocaine before takeoff
They make mistakes, and in particular some of these are mistakes that are more likely when you're flying for your own reasons (usually leisure) rather than because it's a job. "Get-there-itis" is an example, an airline pilot sees the weather at Nashville looks too dodgy, they confer with their colleague, then divert. "Sorry ladies and gentlemen, looks like Nashville's having some attrociously bad weather this evening, we're going to get you on the ground at... Charlotte and make alternative arrangements". But a private pilot father who promised to attend his daughter's performance this evening is damned if he'll divert and miss it, he's going to land at his intended destination. When he realises he might miss the performance by being dead, it's too late.
Of course unexpected catastrophic failures do occur, but I've not seen any statistics that claim that they are a prevalent cause of general aviation crashes.
All that being said, in the case of the MAX, I find it unfathomable to blame pilot error, given the lack of training on the MCAS system.
> I'm not even sure who makes that call: is it the pilots, or someone in a central office somewhere?
The relevant regulation is here,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/121.533
The "operational control" is jointly shared between the pilot in command and the aircraft dispatcher. In theory, either one can cancel the flight. In practice the dispatcher does it or a shift duty manager (who may not be actually performing dispatch duties) who is the "man behind the curtain" and oversees all flight operations during their dirty duty shift. Big carriers may have several managers, assigned per region (CONUS, Asia Pacific, Europe-Trans Atlantic, etc.) but the theory is the same.
[me: licensed dispatcher & former flight ops duty manager]
Very well said.
Point of fact, that captain did initial private pilot training in San Carlos in Cessnas — his airline training was at the airline. “US trained” in this context is similar to a doctor being “US trained” because he did an undergraduate degree in the US but his medical degree somewhere else.
Especially in situations like the MAX crashes you need a feeling for the aircraft.
I'm astonished what this has to do with masculinity, which is of course not outdated (watch who women date ...).
Rotary-wing enthusiasts are just crazy. Everybody knows that.
Reading his article, I got the impression that he has a certain idealised image of what a pilot should be like. One that I have also noticed quite a few people here on HN seem to be rather fond of.
Namely: that being a pilot should not just be someone's job, but their calling. To use a weird phrase I once saw here, they are supposed to be "fixed-wing enthusiasts".
There also seems to be a certain, somewhat outdated, concept of masculinity at play here. And, of course, combining these expectations with stereotypes of African and Asian companies (and people) initially led many to the conclusion that these pilots were either incompetent ("because of a lack of calories in early childhood" to quote one line of reasoning I saw (luckily not here)) or incapable of independent thinking. Never mind that at least one of the captains was trained in the US.
These ideas couldn't be farther from how the system is actually evolving, and how it should be: Flying needs to be boring. If your pilot has a chance to become a hero, the system has already failed. The goal must be a system of technology, institutions, curricula, etc. that makes it perfectly safe to trust any decent high school student to become a competent(-enough) pilot. Candidates with a sense for adventure should be screened out, because flying an airliner is dreadfully boring, and a volatile personality will soon find a way to make it more exciting (drinking, usually).
And planes should become more and more automated. Software and design errors tend to occur just once. Humans tend to make mistakes, even repeatedly, even with the best training. The 737MAX disaster is a terrible outlier that shouldn't obfuscate the fact that in the last 50 years or so, airline fatalities have dropped by an order of magnitude, even thought miles traveled have increased by a similar magnitude.
Combining the two: air travel today is 50 to 100x safer than it was in the golden age of piloting so many seem to glorify.