Re:The Monumental Impact of C
by pjmlp on Wednesday October 02, 2019 @02:31AM
(#21133861)
Surely they knew about buffer overflows, that is something that Burroughs B5500 (nowadays known as Unisys ClearPath) were already trying to tackle in 1961 with ESPOL/NEWP, and C.A.R Hoare has a couple of Algol-60 papers talking about safety and use of bounds checking as one of the preventive measures.
Sure bound exploits aren't limited to C, however there is a big difference between having them in easily locatable unsafe blocks, or areas where one has to explicitly disable them, and having every line of code being a possible source of exploits due to either memory corruption or UB.
According to Google's security team 68% of security exploits in Linux kernel are caused by buffer overflows. Check their talk at Linux Kernel Summit 2018.
At Linux Kernel Summit 2019, they have a couple of newer statistics and are adding hardware memory tagging to Android, based on their collaboration with ARM. And Android's native code (including NDK) are probably the most locked down after OpenBSD, in terms of security frameworks that can't be turned off.
SPARC Solaris, is the only other UNIX that can actually tame C security issues, and even ADI doesn't cover 100% of all possible cases.
Sure bound exploits aren't limited to C, however there is a big difference between having them in easily locatable unsafe blocks, or areas where one has to explicitly disable them, and having every line of code being a possible source of exploits due to either memory corruption or UB.
According to Google's security team 68% of security exploits in Linux kernel are caused by buffer overflows. Check their talk at Linux Kernel Summit 2018.
At Linux Kernel Summit 2019, they have a couple of newer statistics and are adding hardware memory tagging to Android, based on their collaboration with ARM. And Android's native code (including NDK) are probably the most locked down after OpenBSD, in terms of security frameworks that can't be turned off.
SPARC Solaris, is the only other UNIX that can actually tame C security issues, and even ADI doesn't cover 100% of all possible cases.