Since then there is get_random(2) which does the right thing for most applications.
The man page also has this to say:
> The /dev/random device is a legacy interface which dates back to a time where the cryptographic primitives used in the implementation of /dev/urandom were not widely trusted.
I must admit though, that I still don't understand why blocking on insufficient entropy is a bad thing for generating long-lived keys. I'm going to use the key for years, why wouldn't I just wait a couple of seconds or minutes?
In the Linux kernel view of the world, /dev/random "loses" 1 bit of entropy for every bit that gets read.
That is not how cryptographic and hashing primitives work, if it were it would be dangerous to use an AES key to encrypt more than a few megabytes for example.
You wouldn't blame them for it 20-25 years ago, but we've known better for at least 15 years so it'd be nice if they'd get with the program. And it can be fixed without breaking their userspace ABI that they're usually fanatical about not breaking. Linus wanting to break getrandom's ABI just shows he still doesn't understand how CSPRNGs work.