To this day, if you can add a new repository, it is fully trusted and can provide trojaned updates to any core package. Bump the version number to something higher than what the core distro would use and you can persist for quite a long time. I remember pointing this out at a Nokia project (would have been no later than early 2008) as an attack vector via apt repositories.
We wanted to prevent a rogue or compromised repository from being able to provide an update to, say, glibc or libstdc++. Never got to work on that - Elopcalypse took it all down.
Invent idiot-proof security and someone will invent a better idiot. Even if you have a "trusted=1" flag for repos, you can be sure people will set external repos to be just as trusted as the core ones without a second thought as soon as they stop them from doing what they want to do (whatever that is, or however in/sane it is).
It's maybe not the most elegant option, but for security-conscious sysadmins you could already today disable all repos ad hoc and run your "system wide update" only from certain whitelisted repos, while still allowing specific one-off package installs from third party repos.
By adding a third party repo you have already said you trust that repo to install software, probably as root, on your machine. It doesn't get much worse than that from a security standpoint anyway right, will "trust flags" really make much of a difference to the wider security issue?
Sorry if I'm making too many assumptions here or thinking out loud.
That was the thing - you couldn't.
I don't remember which way the level hierarchy went, but the idea was that rpm could not be executed directly even by root (LSM prevented that), and all package installation logic was confined to Zypper/libzypp. Packages and repos could declare their security level. Trying to pull in an upgrade to a LEVEL(core) package from a LEVEL(media) repository would fail. Zypper simply would not allow to install a package from a lower-security repository over an installed package that had come from a higher-security origin. Manually added LEVEL(core) repos would have been ignored.
There were a few layers of applied crypto, package signatures and immutable keyrings involved too. I had a prototype Zypper/libzypp with package-level signature verification almost ready just before my vacation and planned to polish it to an RFC after coming back. Best laid plans... During those two weeks the entirety of Nokia's linux development had been axed, maemo killed and thousands of good embedded systems engineers were suddenly looking for new jobs.
Funny thing, though. Zypper's source code was almost pleasant to work with after having seen the Lovecraftian horrors that made up libapt.
It's not a security feature, but a convenience one for forbidding repositories from updating the packages from the ones you trust more (with correctness). Yes, a binary flag would be useless. What the GP wants also does not add any security, but it's an important part of a stable system that language-specific repositories have been overlooking for a while.
Just take an average startups web project node_modules directory, what's inside there? Hundreds and hundreds of packages of which most are dependencies of other packages. Anyone could have written it! Novice devs swear by using Typescript, but at the same time using hundreds of black boxes that can easily contain stuff way more damaging that a string applied to a number..
Remember left-pad? That was an easy one to fix, but still caused damage at large scale. What about a vulnerability in a larger and more complex package, owned by some bad party?
I'm currently investigating rollup because it only has 3 dependencies (2 of which are @types)
Rollup does have some issues with webapps since it's so heavily oriented toward JS-as-entrypoint, but tbh Webpack has the same issues; it just works around them by layering some extra complexity on top in the form of plugins (which you can actually do relatively easily in rollup too, though it's still not ideal in either situation).
Edit: Just measured those dependencies for comparison.
- rollup: 3 dependencies (all top-level, none have subdependencies. 2 are just typings which contain no executable code)
- webpack: 425 dependencies (23 top-level)
- parcel: 837 dependencies (57 top-level)
I haven't used parcel, so can't comment on its function. By the sounds of their website they're focused on speed, so if performance is your only concern they might be a good shout. If you're looking to reduce your security surface area, their approach to dependency management seems pretty irresponsible.
So I guess I’ll change my suggestion and say just use rollup
That sort of defeats the purpose of switching from webpack.
And for libraries: Why do you even need a bundler? Can you not distribute the library as multiple files?
For your other question it depends on your library. If you’re only targeting ESM or CJS sure, if you need a UMD or want separate outputs for separate targets a bundler like rollup can help prevent a lot of pointless boilerplate.
"Move fast and break things."
The whole Javascript ecosystem depends on high churn rapid adoption of "new" technologies. Stopping to check things would slow this down. Higher-QA technologies get outcompeted by lower-QA technologies.
While both are still relatively strong, it seems that JS's recent (~8y) surge in popularity over established mainstays like Java may stands counter to that point.
Given that the frontend has to be written in Javascript, it's tempting to use it for the backend as well.
"Screw your wheel, we can invent invent our own" is not exactly a surprising strategy when it comes from the language/development community that is mostly building framework after framework that gets abandoned in a year or two.
Linux distros have many, many years of experience curating packages at scale. It is crazy to me that the node community just totally disregards all of the best practices learned by the Linux distros in favor of practices that are lazy and unambiguously dangerous.