Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems
by michaelt on Saturday September 28, 2019 @06:34AM
(#21099584)
GPS replay attacks only need to delay a signal by a very small amount - after all, a radio signal travels 300 meters in a microsecond. And the GPS C/A code has a bandwidth of 1 MHz - 1 microsecond per bit.
Neither frame counters nor timestamps are sufficient to robustly detect a replay attack that delays the signal by a fraction of a single bit.
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems
by krisoft on Saturday September 28, 2019 @06:20AM
(#21099533)
Out of curiosity: airplane receives the broadcasted properly signed packets with frame counter included. How does it know if the antenna broadcasting is the official one or one replaying the official at 2 miles south of the normal glideslope?
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems
by throw0101a on Sunday September 29, 2019 @08:24AM
(#21106624)
> * How does it know if the antenna broadcasting is the official one or one replaying the official at 2 miles south of the normal glideslope?*
With multipole antennas, one can use MLat to determine where the signal came from:
* http://www.multilateration.com/surveillance/multilateration....
* http://www.navcanada.ca/EN/products-and-services/Pages/on-bo...
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilateration
If the signal was received on the antenna pointing forward, then the signal probably came from where you're headed; if it came from an antenna off to the side, then someone may be spoofing.
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems
by TickleSteve on Saturday September 28, 2019 @06:39AM
(#21099600)
this does not solve the original issue of signal strength being faked.... but...
Authentication provides this, not encryption.
The receivers would need a valid certficate to authenticate the transmission.
Either way, there are normal crypto techniques to resolve this issue.