Either way, there are normal crypto techniques to resolve this issue.
Neither frame counters nor timestamps are sufficient to robustly detect a replay attack that delays the signal by a fraction of a single bit.
With multipole antennas, one can use MLat to determine where the signal came from:
* http://www.multilateration.com/surveillance/multilateration....
* http://www.navcanada.ca/EN/products-and-services/Pages/on-bo...
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilateration
If the signal was received on the antenna pointing forward, then the signal probably came from where you're headed; if it came from an antenna off to the side, then someone may be spoofing.
Authentication provides this, not encryption.
The receivers would need a valid certficate to authenticate the transmission.
Not necessarily? It should be possible to encode at least a timestamp so that a replay wouldn't work; or even implement a challenge-response so that each plane has their own signal? Not trivial of course but possible...?