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Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by bambax on Saturday September 28, 2019 @04:54AM (#21099267)
> even supporting cryptographic authentication on ILS signals would still leave systems vulnerable to record and replay attacks

Not necessarily? It should be possible to encode at least a timestamp so that a replay wouldn't work; or even implement a challenge-response so that each plane has their own signal? Not trivial of course but possible...?

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by TickleSteve on Saturday September 28, 2019 @05:39AM (#21099410)
The normal defence against replay attacks is to use a framecounter rather than a timestamp.

Either way, there are normal crypto techniques to resolve this issue.

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by michaelt on Saturday September 28, 2019 @06:34AM (#21099584)
GPS replay attacks only need to delay a signal by a very small amount - after all, a radio signal travels 300 meters in a microsecond. And the GPS C/A code has a bandwidth of 1 MHz - 1 microsecond per bit.

Neither frame counters nor timestamps are sufficient to robustly detect a replay attack that delays the signal by a fraction of a single bit.

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by krisoft on Saturday September 28, 2019 @06:20AM (#21099533)
Out of curiosity: airplane receives the broadcasted properly signed packets with frame counter included. How does it know if the antenna broadcasting is the official one or one replaying the official at 2 miles south of the normal glideslope?
Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by throw0101a on Sunday September 29, 2019 @08:24AM (#21106624)
> * How does it know if the antenna broadcasting is the official one or one replaying the official at 2 miles south of the normal glideslope?*

With multipole antennas, one can use MLat to determine where the signal came from:

* http://www.multilateration.com/surveillance/multilateration....

* http://www.navcanada.ca/EN/products-and-services/Pages/on-bo...

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multilateration

If the signal was received on the antenna pointing forward, then the signal probably came from where you're headed; if it came from an antenna off to the side, then someone may be spoofing.

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by TickleSteve on Saturday September 28, 2019 @06:39AM (#21099600)
this does not solve the original issue of signal strength being faked.... but...

Authentication provides this, not encryption.

The receivers would need a valid certficate to authenticate the transmission.

Re:Wireless attacks on aircraft instrument landing systems by yorwba on Saturday September 28, 2019 @05:37AM (#21099401)
As I understood the article, localization is based on signal strength, so cryptographically protecting the signal content is absolutely useless against an attacker who simply amplifies the signal without modifying it.