People who actually need anonymity need to hide among traffic that is boring. If you reduce the number of hops your crawler is using, you're reducing the amount of boring traffic and making it easier to find the interesting people.
Running a relay in addition to using Tor in the normal way is a good idea, however, as it increases the bandwidth of the network.
But if the received wisdom becomes "if you're not rebelling against an oppressive regime, you should only be using 1 hop" then the advice has real harmful effects.
onion like "layered" services
The Tor Project recently added a consensus flag which can globally disable single hop client connections as a DDoS mitigation approach. It is currently enabled. (DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous)
For the uninitiated, can you please explain the differences in what they are and how they're accessed?
The differences are explained in the post. The dark web is a vast groups of services that cannot be accessed without using special software / proxy.
The hidden services are service running on the TOR network and accessed using a browser that use the TOR proxy.
They are a type of dark web services, but not the entirety
This takes me to the 1990's.... "groups of services that cannot be accessed without using special software" definitely matches NNTP, FTP, SMTP, SSH, HTTP, etc.
> The dark web is a vast groups of services that cannot be accessed without using special software / proxy.
Can you name a few for examples?
From tor blog:
A new relay, assuming it is reliable and has plenty of bandwidth, goes through four phases: the unmeasured phase (days 0-3) where it gets roughly no use, the remote-measurement phase (days 3-8) where load starts to increase, the ramp-up guard phase (days 8-68) where load counterintuitively drops and then rises higher, and the steady-state guard phase (days 68+).
That's true, you never want to rebuild the circuit. But it strikes me that the idea that this is avoidable falls into at least two of the Eight Fallacies of Distributed Computing[1], namely "The Network Is Reliable" and "Topology Doesn't Change".
If we instead assume that the network isn't reliable, and topology does change, then instead of eliminating unreliable nodes and being conservative with changes to the topology, we would focus on reducing the costs of rebuilding a circuit so that network unreliability and topology changes aren't disastrous.
But it sounds like the Tor team has instead decided to bolster these assumptions, to make them less of assumptions; trying to make the network as reliable as possible and trying to make the topology change as little as possible.
I don't mean this to be a harsh criticism of the Tor team. I'm an outsider, and beyond an uncompromising privacy constraint, I don't know all the constraints Tor was built under. I'm sure the tradeoffs made by the Tor team make sense within the context of their constraints. Obviously, the Tor network works well enough to have a large user base, so they have provided a good-enough solution.
But I wonder if changes could be made to Tor's design in the future which would allow quicker adding and removing nodes, and handle network reliability issues better, so that Tor would be faster.
One possibility which stands out to me is to pool circuits and load-balance between them, so that if a circuit begins to have issues, you still are connected along other circuits while you build a new circuit to replace the unreliable one. This possibly would run into issues where correlate could correlate traffic from different circuits to unmask clients, so you'd have to be careful, but I'm not sure these problems would be insurmountable.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacies_of_distributed_compu...
But remember: What tor is doing is hard. They are doing complex crypto, networking, security.... The hard stuff. The real stuff. Torproject is a nonprofit organization with limited capabilities. They are doing their best. It took 3 years to design and implement dos mitigation techniques, for example.
Your proposed plan could take over 10 years, even for a well funded corporation. It might take time and fail. It might create huge vulnerability due to code complexity. Afaik, tor can’t risk that.
I mean, it's a dumb idea, but until you force people to contribute, most won't. I've looked at doing it, but didn't want to deal with legal headaches b/c creepy pedos use tor, too.
The thought is that other people are hiding in your noise. Make less noise, other people stand out more.
I2P Freenet Tor Zeronet
Can somebody list some positive, legitimate, not illegal uses to desperately be anonymous?
Most people, when they hear of things like "the dark web" and cryptocurrency think about the massively publicized instances of drug trafficking and ordering a hit on someone.
It's going to take a lot of work to reframe the utility and purpose of them to a more universal, humanitarian angle.
People in this world live in oppressive circumstances. This should be viewed as a step toward helping them not be systemically silenced.
If one is willing to argue that the US government throwing someone in a cage because the grew or bought the wrong plant is legitimate, then I don't see how they have any standing to complain about China doing something for someone who held up the wrong sign at a protest.
Reminds me a bit of what you see with how some societies approach drug addiction. Providing a safe space with clean needles vs throwing in a prison. There's a lot to think about.
And I think we've seen some of that with the marijuana legalization across the US. The state adoption had strong initial resistance, but public opinion began to shift once it got out of the shroud of stigma and moral enforcement.
Give me a solid reason for why you want corporations and governments to have access to detailed records of everything you do online.
There's value in that data to certain groups of people and we may not like what the future looks like once that value is tapped to its potential.
In a good, free society, maybe anonymity isn’t important.
But in a bad society, one in which collaboration on a cause is punished, but each individual desperately wants to collaborate and change something fundamental...
Anonymity allows the planning of synchronized action.
——
Mass or targeted misinformation also threatens the planning of synchronized action.
There is something of a Catch 22 here I think. A society in which it's difficult or costly to be do something anonymously is essentially a society with total surveillance.
And it seems intuitive that a surveillance state is not good or free.
So there is an argument you can make that good and free societies should allow anonymity even if they are the sort of society where it is least needed.
You are being tracked at the very least as an abstract person. If any of the above fingerprints are linked to a real identity (logging in just once even, or posting your email on a forum) then you are now being tracked even logged out.
If you use Tor and log into services it has no benefits. Tor, the browser and other distributions, will still leave fingerprints but they will no longer be unique and match only you but everyone using tor.
Tor, the protocol, will hide that you are the one receiving or sending packets.
"why Tor would be any better than simply browsing in incognito mode"
Incognito mode does nothing to hide packets or source/destination you are communicating to. Your ISP could literally pull up all non-https sites you visited along with their content, assignable to you, airstrike, as a person. Tor would block this.
Second, to anyone crawling hidden services or crawling over tor, please run a relay or decrease your hop. Don’t sacrifice other’s desperate need for anonymity for your $whatever_purpose_thats_probably_not_important. It could be some fun thing to do for you, but some people are relying on tor to use the free, secure and anonymous Internet.