Re:Boeing's Managerial Revolution Created the 737 Max Disaster
by joe_the_user on Saturday September 21, 2019 @04:08PM
(#21037627)
Nearly TWO DECADES before Boeing’s MCAS system crashed two of the plane-maker’s brand-new 737 MAX jets, Stan Sorscher knew his company’s increasingly toxic mode of operating would create a disaster of some kind. A long and proud “safety culture” was rapidly being replaced, he argued, with “a culture of financial bullshit, a culture of groupthink.” (Emphasis added).
But, the situation is that US air travel got safer during a lot of those two decades. Indeed, the two crashes world aren't enough to push air travel back two decades and safety standards and the rarity of crashes were enough catch the problem.
The 737 Max is a huge problem for Boeing in particular, creating a situation where the endgame is hard to see. But not as much for air travel generally, which continues to be cheap and safe. And Boeing made a lot of planes and lot of money in the last two decades.
Which is to say when things are "pushed to boards", it's hard to say exactly when they give out. The 737 Max system was about minimizing costs everywhere in the system - costs in testing, costs in training and costs in operation. The multilevel Rube Goldberg approach finally failed but it's had a long run, the 737 800 is a workhorse of air travel.
Still, I suppose the lesson is multilevel optimization can result in a catastrophic systems failure. There are probably much processes where this could happen - just think when all the cars are Internet connected.
But, the situation is that US air travel got safer during a lot of those two decades. Indeed, the two crashes world aren't enough to push air travel back two decades and safety standards and the rarity of crashes were enough catch the problem.
The 737 Max is a huge problem for Boeing in particular, creating a situation where the endgame is hard to see. But not as much for air travel generally, which continues to be cheap and safe. And Boeing made a lot of planes and lot of money in the last two decades.
Which is to say when things are "pushed to boards", it's hard to say exactly when they give out. The 737 Max system was about minimizing costs everywhere in the system - costs in testing, costs in training and costs in operation. The multilevel Rube Goldberg approach finally failed but it's had a long run, the 737 800 is a workhorse of air travel.
Still, I suppose the lesson is multilevel optimization can result in a catastrophic systems failure. There are probably much processes where this could happen - just think when all the cars are Internet connected.