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Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by masklinn on Monday September 16, 2019 @01:08PM (#20986207)
The only case where it could be an issue is at bootup, when the subsystem simply does not have enough entropy. OpenBSD solved that by storing a seed for next bootup at the end of boot and during shutdown.
Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by asamarin on Monday September 16, 2019 @04:34PM (#20988290)
So what happens at the very first boot (e.g. after system installation, or cloud instance just being spawned)? Is that the only circumstance where it would be OK to block? Does OpenBSD trust RdRand for such occasions?
Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by ChrisSD on Monday September 16, 2019 @06:33PM (#20989212)
You can set /etc/random.seed (or /var/db/host.random for spawned instances) prior to first boot. That's what cloud providers do IIRC. It also mixes in hardware random (if available).
Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by boring_twenties on Monday September 16, 2019 @08:13PM (#20989855)
> Does OpenBSD trust RdRand for such occasions?

It is used as one source among many to seed the PRNG, so I think the answer is no.

Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by gnud on Monday September 16, 2019 @06:33PM (#20989214)
A new cloud instance seems like a small problem. The host could just generate an entropy file for the first boot.
Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by caf on Tuesday September 17, 2019 @12:38AM (#20991610)
Yes - the hard case is a little flash-based low power ARM router, cloned by the million.
Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by Reelin on Tuesday September 17, 2019 @03:46AM (#20992654)
From 2012, but still at least somewhat relevant (https://factorable.net/weakkeys12.extended.pdf).

> RSA and DSA can fail catastrophically when used with malfunctioning random number generators ... network survey of TLS and SSH servers and present evidence that vulnerable keys are surprisingly widespread ... we are able to obtain RSA private keys for 0.50% of TLS hosts and 0.03% of SSH hosts, because their public keys shared nontrivial common factors due to entropy problems, and DSA private keys for 1.03% of SSH hosts, because of insufficient signature randomness ... the vast majority appear to be headless or embedded devices ...

Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by simonh on Monday September 16, 2019 @02:09PM (#20986919)
I hope the seed is very well protected.
Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by VibrantClarity on Monday September 16, 2019 @03:31PM (#20987713)
wdym? if an attacker can access your filesystem its already game over
Re:Linux Kernel 5.3 by iforgotpassword on Tuesday September 17, 2019 @05:41AM (#20993283)
The same could be said for some of the entropy sources that were nerfed or removed over time due to security concerns. That's the main reason why we even are in this situation today.