News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Supermicro server BMCs left exposed to remote attack by a... by nullc on Tuesday September 03, 2019 @05:30PM (#20871390)
> should never be exposed to the internet

Good luck with that, on many devices the BMC gets silently bridged onto the lan ports even if you make a significant effort to prevent it.

Even where you think you have it isolated and have tested, you may later find yourself thwarted when an unoverridable bridge gets triggered any time the dedicated BMC port's link is down.

Re:Supermicro server BMCs left exposed to remote attack by a... by EB66 on Tuesday September 03, 2019 @06:48PM (#20872052)
> Good luck with that, on many devices the BMC gets silently bridged onto the lan ports even if you make a significant effort to prevent it.

I don't think that's true.

I can't speak for all devices, but I've worked with a lot of Dell and SuperMicro servers and they all have an option in the BIOS for this. You specify if the BMC should operate on it's own dedicated network port or share the network port used for primary network uplink.

From the network traffic logs I've gathered, I've never seen any indication of the BMC interfering with the primary LAN ports when the BMC is set to use the dedicated LAN port. Additionally, the BMC doesn't revert back to the shared port if the link is broken on the dedicated port -- the BIOS setting prevents that.

At my company we've configured all of the BMCs to use the dedicated LAN port, those LAN ports are connected to physically separate top of cabinet switches, and those switches are linked to a fully independent core router with it's own independent uplink to the internet. The BMCs are only assigned private network IPs and can only be accessed by outside users through a VPN. This is all very standard practice for the hosting industry.

Re:Supermicro server BMCs left exposed to remote attack by a... by nullc on Saturday September 07, 2019 @07:43PM (#20907470)
> I can't speak for all devices, but I've worked with a lot of Dell and SuperMicro servers and they all have an option in the BIOS for this. You specify if the BMC should operate on it's own dedicated network port or share the network port used for primary network uplink.

They do, but on the three supermicro board types I have here, simply doing that but then leaving the BMC port disconnected results in them bridging onto the lan anyways. They obey the setting but only so long as a link is up on the BMC port.

Re:Supermicro server BMCs left exposed to remote attack by a... by nightfly on Tuesday September 03, 2019 @05:34PM (#20871426)
Having static IPs on your management devices on a separate subnet and vlan from your regular host ports should mostly mitigate this.
Re:Supermicro server BMCs left exposed to remote attack by a... by persistent on Tuesday September 03, 2019 @05:47PM (#20871536)
How? The BMC can intercept and inject any ethernet frames that it cares to inject.
Re:Supermicro server BMCs left exposed to remote attack by a... by EB66 on Tuesday September 03, 2019 @06:59PM (#20872175)
Not when you've gone into the BIOS and configured the BMC to only operate on it's dedicated port.

I'm responsible for netsec at my company and I've never seen any indication of the BMC network activity on primary network ports after I've configured the BMC in BIOS to use it's dedicated network port.

Re:Supermicro server BMCs left exposed to remote attack by a... by jessaustin on Tuesday September 03, 2019 @05:56PM (#20871621)
What happens to those frames? Will a router configured for a particular VLAN pass through whatever the BMC happens to invent?
Re:Supermicro server BMCs left exposed to remote attack by a... by z3t4 on Wednesday September 04, 2019 @03:47AM (#20874900)
For example your server might have 3 network ports, one is a dedicated BMC, but if it's not populated it will bridge to one of the other two, so basically you only have 1 port that is safe to use.