Re:Boeing's Crashes Expose Systemic Failings
by privateSFacct on Sunday September 01, 2019 @02:50PM
(#20853980)
Correct - limited / no redundancy tech side.
The design redundancy was the pilot in the loop - ie, in a stab trim situation pilot would follow a memory item. So this meant much less automation protection compared to systems without pilot in loop.
Also Southwest certainly did not have all of the indicators at first, because they added some: https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/southwest-airlines... (note that pretty much nobody used that kind of indicator before, so I don't say that to put blame on Southwest)
It was also my understanding that some alarms including the AoA disagree were optional and for a fee even though probably activated by only needing to switch a bit somewhere in the software. So if Southwest had AoA disagree from the beginning (I don't know), well that's cool, but my interpretation is more like: that's not cool that some other airlines did not have it because of the dubious commercial practices of Boeing.