The Myth of Consumer-Grade Security

Re:The Myth of Consumer-Grade Security by dredmorbius on Thursday August 29, 2019 @03:10PM (#20832611)

So: the point being that despite having a secure network, the immediate impetus was to connect it to the insecure one?

And that without IP and network isolation, HOSTS.TXT was an utterly meaningless obfuscation / network isolation mechansim (which was apparently not ... apparent ... to them)?

The only bureaucracy more SNAFUd than government and military is private sector. You just don't hear so much about it except through lawsuits and leaks -- no congressional investigations or constituent concerns. Representation has some advantages.

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Re:The Myth of Consumer-Grade Security by GhettoMaestro on Friday August 30, 2019 @01:33PM (#20840673)

SIPRNet (the secure version) has a parallel network for unclassified traffic (eg surfing foxnews / open-source intelligence / checking your gmail).

If I had to take a wild guess, an executive at some point said "why do I NEED to switch between these two terminals? Can't it all be secure on just one of them? I just want to be able to reply to outside emails on the SPIRNet."

And thus it happened, or probably something like that. Never underestimate the "executive factor".

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Re:The Myth of Consumer-Grade Security by dredmorbius on Friday August 30, 2019 @01:44PM (#20840772)

Thanks. Much as I'd suspected.

And EF is very QED in DJT.

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