I was storing backup codes in 1P before I realized that I was putting all my eggs in one proverbial basket.
Probably wouldn't be a bad idea to have a distinct password vault for TOTP seeds, although they'll be stored on whatever device you generate codes from anyway (hopefully in a secure way). At the very least, it might be helpful for moving between TOTP devices without needing to do the random steps required by different services!
It's pretty obvious why this changed, however, it is a major increase in exposure and a terrible change overall. It is discussed in [1] and mostly the answers aren't very satisfying as demonstrated in [2].
[1] https://discussions.agilebits.com/discussion/101560/secure-m...
[2] https://discussions.agilebits.com/discussion/101551/article-...
I guess it makes sense. By the time an adversary gets your key you would of noticed and have locked that key from your account.
With SecurID and similar technologies vendors technically didn't need to retain the secrets inside those devices after they'd been manufactured and shipped, but you can see the practical temptation.
On a smaller scale, since the system doesn't use a shared secret you should just swap a brand new Security Key with somebody else or if deploying to an organisation just muddle them and let people pick whichever one they want. You don't care which key you have, the more random the better.
Definitely, it's an expensive vulnerability to simply reveal though. YubiKeys are proprietary so they can't be audited by non-contracted third parties. There are FOSS security keys that don't have that problem though.
That is precisely what these devices are designed to stop. The device has a private key stored in hardware in a way that it cannot be retrieved by software. When you use one of these devices you dramatically decrease your number of attack vectors because now the attack has to happen physically. Someone has to actually steal your physical key. And because this is your "second factor", if that happens they still also have to have your password.
Two-factor apps get closer to this, but they usually can be copied. For instance, 1Password can be set up to mimic Google Authenticator.
> I do want to know if this is purely marketing hype
This is most definitely NOT marketing hype. It is the current security best practice.