The light is software controlled, as this very change clearly demonstrates. The fact Google can turn and off the light at a whim suggests an attacker could. Your defense of this being possible is based on a vague theory of infallible security.
You even seem to use a fictional quote to that end:
> What other methods besides “issue Google-signed firmware to the device” are you implying exist
Who are you quoting? What are you quoting? And where can I read up on google's infallible firmware signing strategy that you're implying has the ability to block exploits and bugs?
Despite claims to the contrary you're less "requesting an explanation" and more making several unsupported security claims, then asking people to refute your claims as if they were factual in nature.
If this device was as secure as you imply that would be quite unique for smart home devices in general, and software in general for that matter.
In my words: Nest devices had security issues in the past [1]. It’s very likely that they still have issues today (like most software). Once a hacker gains enough control of the device she can turn off the led because it’s software controlled[2].
[1] https://gizmodo.com/this-nest-security-flaw-is-remarkably-du...
[2] https://www.grahamcluley.com/webcam-spying-without-turning-l...
"And where can I read up on google's infallible firmware signing strategy that you're implying has the ability to block exploits and bugs?"
I have no clue where on the scale of "state action" -> "bribed/coerced insider" -> "disgruntled ex google employee" -> "Elbonian strip kiddie" you need to be to "control that lamp", but I'm 100% certain that the reality is that the capability to revert this new lamp behaviour is not exclusively in the hands of authorised Google employees...
It's exactly the same as the current encryption bullshit. If there's a backdoor for law enforcement, there's a backdoor. If there's a remote way for Google to update the Nest software - there's an exploitable remote way to update the software.
This is (quite obviously?) wrong. One doesn't imply the other at all in any way shape or form. If this were true, there wouldn't be a single device on the planet, including phones, servers, etc. with remote update functionality that would be secure, ever.
Also
>If there's a backdoor for law enforcement, there's a backdoor.
duh? But I think what you are trying to imply is that "there is a backdoor that criminals could use" - which is also wrong. As long as the implementation is correct and the key isn't leaked, this is completely secure. Of course it'd be insane to have one key being able to unlock essentially all communication within a huge system, because chances are it might be leaked eventually, but that has absolutely zero impact on the fundamental possibility of making this system secure.
You're so, so close to waking up from the matrix. Very excited to have you join us in the real world soon! Follow the white rabbit.
Perhaps malicious code will be produced which will only take single frame shots, never staying on cycle long enough to trigger the light.
Or it will go unnoticed because it flashes on and off so quickly.
I wasn't even considering remote attackers, but I'd imagine it's not a large step from [compromising a remote camera such that you can remotely record] to [compromising a remote camera such that you can control other software features while remotely recording].
I admit this update does make it a bit more difficult (for now?) for remote hackers to secretly record people; I'd be interested to see how prevalent that is compared to people actually just recording people with their own cameras.
1) “Forcing Google to do so through a government court order that leads to a firmware update to that specific camera”
What other methods besides “issue Google-signed firmware to the device” are you implying exist (“a myriad of ways”), that are obvious enough to be taken for granted without further explanation?
I can’t see them, and so unfortunately I must request that explanation.