Issue of scope. Chrome isn't selectively insecure.
>AFAIK there is no general protocol insecurity with TLS <= 1.2, unlike SSL3. There's also no reason for MITM proxies to not start using 1.3 too once it becomes more common, which I'm pretty sure will happen.
Browsers are very particular about how they communicate certificate validation failures. This is generally obscured by the MITM proxy, as is the certificate itself. Making MITM easy will inevitably lead to people running badly made proxies, especially if such a proxy is installed to the system as adware, the same reason both Chrome and Firefox wouldn't allow random unsigned extensions.
I'd honestly be surprised if any of them do HSTS properly.
>IMHO the whole "security" thing has turned into a power-grab for companies to enforce their control over users, which is the most disturbing part. We want security, but also control, which is not the "security" they want.
You can run dev builds - usually even the official ones - to turn most of those security features off. They're intended for your average non-power user.
>Edit: yay, instant downvotes! I hope you enjoy being herded by Google, because that's where the future is heading if we don't oppose.
That's what you get for making an argument about browser vendors about Google and conflating it with Chrome issues in a different scope.
Maybe I'm missing something, but what would an MITM proxy have to do here as long as it passes the HSTS headers on to the browser?
As far as I understand, HSTS changes browser behavior in two places:
- A browser will always connect to a domain via HTTPS, even if the URL says HTTP. - TLS errors become unskippable.
Both behaviors are carried out by the browser and are not influenced by the specifics of the TLS connection itself (as long as a connection can be established).
> You can run dev builds - usually even the official ones - to turn most of those security features off. They're intended for your average non-power user.
But this is about average non-power users. Because the current trends force those users to place their complete trust in browser vendors or website operators, even if there were local administrators or third-party tools who could do a better job.
To avoid introducing vulnerabilities, the way lots of antivirus MITMs do, for example. Like it says in the rest of your quote.
> Especially Google's, because that's one of the ways you can still block ads and modify pages to have them displayed as the user(-agent) wants, while it continues to slowly remove abilities from browser extensions.
Blocking ads by MITM? Yikes. Extensions are very much a better tool for that. The idea that browser vendors are going to slowly cripple them so that they’re no longer an effective blocking tool is… wrong. But anyone who was on Chrome can use Firefox anyway.
> IMHO the whole "security" thing has turned into a power-grab for companies to enforce their control over users, which is the most disturbing part. We want security, but also control, which is not the "security" they want.
FUD.
> Edit: yay, instant downvotes! I hope you enjoy being herded by Google, because that's where the future is heading if we don't oppose.
Don’t.
Did you not see this at all? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20044430
Don’t.
You're certainly displaying your allegiance to Big G...
No. It is the user's problem, created by the ISP.
> Mine doesn't do that.
Otherwise put: "It isn't a problem for me, so why is anyone working on the issue instead of something that I do care about"
> I trust it more than Google, at any rate.
Fair enough. Though for many, choosing not to use Google properties is a lot easier than choosing not to use an ISP that they don't entirely trust.
Sorry, I wasn't specific enough. The poster I was replying to was commenting on their browser and I was expanding that to mean their browser and other applications.
Blocking all access to all Google services could be an uncompletable task, unless you start from blocking everything and using a white-list approach only which it unlikely to be practical (on top of creating the whitelist you'd have to monitor it and react when they or one of their related entities buy out or otherwise co-opt services you might have whitelisted in the past.
There are fairly comprehensive (though given the volunteer effort involved I'm sure they aren't 100%) lists available, but I don't know of one specific to Google so you would end up blocking other similar services unless you add your own filter to the filter list before using it.
> if I choose to block it all (despite that rendering half the web unusable)?
I doubt it would make nearly that much unusable. The only one of their services that blocking would stop you using other things is recapcha and I dare say anything "hidden" behind that is also available elsewhere. Blocking analytics isn't going to affect you as a user, maps blocks itself a lot ATM anyway ("this site is configured incorrectly" messages where a map should be because the rules for inlining maps have changed (or their enforcement has) and people haven't updated their pages to reflect the policy change at Google), etc.
No, I mean it's a technological workaround to what is ultimately a policy problem, and those never end well. It also happens to be a workaround that gives Google (and basically all the other anti-user corporatocracy) more power and ostensibly good PR in the form of "security".
If data privacy is your goal, keeping both at arms length would be ideal... except most people can't choose how much data* ISPs scoop up, or even choose to switch to a competitor if they disagree with an ISP's policies.
*In contrast, you can control a decent amount of what Google collects on you.
> Google monetizes your data themselves
That's what I thought abt Facebook and Twitter: It looks like they might ship anonymized (or not) data to third-parties when appropriate. Amazon, too, make a lot of data available to sellers on their platform.
Google could be doing that, too, in the guise of claiming to do something else. Or, it already is.
This is about disincentivising ISPs. If it's hard for them to pull off, they wouldn't do it and it would become something normal every ISP does.
US people will need to start to complain a lot. You are beeing abused.
If you don't trust your ISP you really should use a VPN. You still have to trust your ISP if you don't and nothing that megacorps do can help you there.
1: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/firefox-dns-over-https
SNI is probably the most critical here, and it is getting opportunistic encryption.
Threat modeling. Do it.
DoH not just doesn't help privacy, it makes it worse for everyone by letting another party to get their DNS data and by centralizing requests on that party to actually help NSA and large scale commercial spying. ISPs are still going to get that data too though. And theoretical possibility of encrypted SNI is definitely not going to prevent that, it's probably not going to be a thing at all, just remember how quickly all the megacorps jumped in to close the equivalent domain fronting technique under a little bit of pressure from governments forcing megacorps to allow governments to identify traffic to censor something specific or get all their networks blacklisted on the IP level.
Megacorp proposed "security" and "privacy" solutions generally do not do anything good for end users at all only take away control from end users. These are the times we live in.
But we can still survive it, Google is afraid of something and keeps a usable browser open source. And if things go south it won't be hard for a browser fork to implement a proper feature to allow interception of network requests before encryption and responses after decryption with another program, while disabling anti-features.
It turns out that most of the MITM products have questionable / insecure TLS stacks [1] and can introduce insecurity to user web traffic.
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1529830 That's why. When you developing HTTP/load balancers it's a good way to test browser in the same environment.
Yet. That we know of.
> yay, instant downvotes! I hope you enjoy being herded by Google
Yay! Complaining about downvotes! I hope you enjoy more downvotes.
For example Padding Oracles are not an inherent flaw in TLS 1.2, the protocol itself doesn't oblige you to tell attackers "You guessed wrong" until they guess right. But it becomes your responsibility to not let them know, an apparently optimal TLS implementation functions as a timing Oracle for CBC mode and can be exploited. Making CBC implementations sufficiently opaque that an adversary can't tell if they guessed the padding bytes correctly is really hard, OpenSSL have failed twice so far already. In TLS 1.3 this isn't an issue, it only has AEAD primitives.
And lack of Forward Secrecy is a pretty serious problem for some applications. It's not fatal, but it's a problem. In TLS 1.3 you always get Forward Secrecy. In TLS 1.2 it was optional, so unless you're explicitly configuring the ciphersuites used there's no guarantee.
FUD. Why should we want "behaves exactly as the browser does", when browsers (in fact, mostly Google's) are in fact turning against their users?
While browser vendors are wary of any sort of interception of HTTPS traffic
Especially Google's, because that's one of the ways you can still block ads and modify pages to have them displayed as the user(-agent) wants, while it continues to slowly remove abilities from browser extensions.
Similarly, the MITM might not support the most secure versions of protocols supported by the browser and the server (e.g. TLS/1.3)
AFAIK there is no general protocol insecurity with TLS <= 1.2, unlike SSL3. There's also no reason for MITM proxies to not start using 1.3 too once it becomes more common, which I'm pretty sure will happen.
this approach is generally preferable to MITM proxies.
...because it provides no way to modify the content, i.e. being able to do things like block ads, inject stylesheets, and generally behave as the user wants.
IMHO the whole "security" thing has turned into a power-grab for companies to enforce their control over users, which is the most disturbing part. We want security, but also control, which is not the "security" they want.
(This comment was posted from a browser that does not support even SSL 2.0, but is using TLS 1.2 via a proxy... and I know that 1.3 will be coming sometime in the future. When that happens, everything that goes through it can also start using 1.3.)
Edit: yay, instant downvotes! I hope you enjoy being herded by Google, because that's where the future is heading if we don't oppose.