Re:Basic Electron Framework Exploitation
by pvg on Wednesday August 07, 2019 @03:31PM
(#20638043)
The claim is it's easier to bypass some app integrity protection mechanisms when the target is an Electron app.
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Re:Basic Electron Framework Exploitation
by hnbroseph on Wednesday August 07, 2019 @05:34PM
(#20639366)
"easier" than what? and is it particularly noteworthy? if malicious code has write access to any given app's constituent files, there's effectively no app that's hard to subvert.
Easier than apps that are better covered by system app integrity protection? I'm not sure what's unclear about this, it's right in the writeup.
If you're talking about installing apps, every installed app needs to be signed (unless you ignore Windows/macOS warnings). If you're talking about injection or modifying program files (be them executables, DLLs, or ASARs) post-install, every app is equally-vulnerable. There is no functional difference between a native app or an Electron app in that regard, so maybe you can clarify what you mean by "system app integrity protection."
so maybe you can clarify
I didn't write this thing, I'm just saying that the claims it makes are not the claims you say it makes. 'Functionally equivalent' is a bit like 'Turing complete' - it makes it easy to say something so true it's not actually interesting.
It's not some major discovery or controversial claim that Electron apps are an even more convenient and easier-to-leverage vector for exploitation than regular old binaries. But writing some blog post about it (they didn't give the vuln a name, they didn't rent it shoes, they aren't buying it a beer) does not warrant the weird invective you're throwing at it.
I wasn't trying to be snippy, I genuinely didn't understand what you meant since the term "system app integrity protection" isn't anywhere in the original blog post. Also, just to clarify, by "functionally equivalent" I meant "exactly the same."