I think it is great to have an alternative DNS system that is more censorship resistant.
So every time I add a new LB, or cycle out an environment I have to pay someone? And then wait for them to process the chain to publish the result?
Remind me, what did etherium get to for transactons to clear? 20 something hours? That is not something I want when I am trying to redirect traffic from either a set of NS records that are broken, or if I host the full zone in the chain, a broken AWS / Azure region.
Combine the time to wait for caches to refresh on the internets (better these days, but still longer than people would like), with waiting for a blockchain to publish my new records, and you have ops people in pain.
DNS is already one of the largest fault tolerant, eventually consistent, cachable, federated, and globally distributed key value databases ever to exist - we don't need to add blockchain to the mix.
I don't see how this follows at all.
The slowing transaction incorporation times for major cryptocurrencies is related to transaction volume, not to the total size of the chain to date. Presumably a system restricted to updated HNS entries would not encounter anywhere near the same transaction volume.
A pretty small price to pay for the superior features.
For private info perhaps DNS will continue to work just fine for companies. Theoretically you can also host private block-chains and use that if you really wanted to.
I am still trying to figure out what superior features these are, even for me as a small sites.
For certs, I can have Lets Encrypt, and set a CAA record of letsencypt.org. For DNS, I can host my own, or use one of the myriad of providers out there.
I am not likely to have my domain taken away from me (and neither are most people), so the DNS ROOT switch is not a draw.
Why would I move to a DNS ROOT with no one on it?
Additionally, HNS also fixes the problems the CA system has today. CAs can generate certificates for any domain - even if the domain owner didn’t request it. This has led to countless occurrences of abuse.
Good luck with that. If there is no way to have a US court take ownership of a domain (or force someone to handover a bad faith registration), someone will either end up in jail for contempt, or it will just be banned.
> Additionally, HNS also fixes the problems the CA system has today. CAs can generate certificates for any domain - even if the domain owner didn’t request it. This has led to countless occurrences of abuse.
It fixes the non EV cert situation (kind of - CAA records also help this, and work on the standard internet), but doesn't fix EV certs (i.e. amzon.tld is actually Amazon LLC and not Scammers R Us Ltd.)
It also ignores the reality of most major companies in the world MITM'ing all outbound traffic from offices to ensure sensitive content is not exfilled from the company - there is 0 chance of them allowing traffic out that they could not MITM.
This same argument applies to bitcoin and it has not (yet) been banned in much of the free world.
I'm not totally sure how this one works but with ENS there are key holders that theoretically have the ability to do operations on any entry but it takes a certain number of them to all coordinate and agree.
We have seen this before, where people who run these services are personally held in contempt until they comply with the order.
* I say "usually" because more complex permissions schemes are possible with Bitcoin Script. m-of-n in particular I could see being very useful; it could allow individuals to update some parts of the record but not all - for instance, make it mathematically impossible to abandon the domain or move where it's pointed, but still possible to update contact information.
From what I've heard, the "Layer 2" networks for even the most venerable of blockchains have the potential to reduce transaction times a couple of orders of magnitude.
I get the "global, transparent, append only log" appeal, but for the reality of most people, I don't want to rely on a blockchain converging, or processing my update in a certain amount of time.
And that doesn't even cover companies (I don't agree with this, but it is a reality), that consider DNS entries private, and don't want to expose an easily scannable list of DNS entries .