Additionally, HNS also fixes the problems the CA system has today. CAs can generate certificates for any domain - even if the domain owner didn’t request it. This has led to countless occurrences of abuse.
Good luck with that. If there is no way to have a US court take ownership of a domain (or force someone to handover a bad faith registration), someone will either end up in jail for contempt, or it will just be banned.
> Additionally, HNS also fixes the problems the CA system has today. CAs can generate certificates for any domain - even if the domain owner didn’t request it. This has led to countless occurrences of abuse.
It fixes the non EV cert situation (kind of - CAA records also help this, and work on the standard internet), but doesn't fix EV certs (i.e. amzon.tld is actually Amazon LLC and not Scammers R Us Ltd.)
It also ignores the reality of most major companies in the world MITM'ing all outbound traffic from offices to ensure sensitive content is not exfilled from the company - there is 0 chance of them allowing traffic out that they could not MITM.
This same argument applies to bitcoin and it has not (yet) been banned in much of the free world.
I'm not totally sure how this one works but with ENS there are key holders that theoretically have the ability to do operations on any entry but it takes a certain number of them to all coordinate and agree.
We have seen this before, where people who run these services are personally held in contempt until they comply with the order.
* I say "usually" because more complex permissions schemes are possible with Bitcoin Script. m-of-n in particular I could see being very useful; it could allow individuals to update some parts of the record but not all - for instance, make it mathematically impossible to abandon the domain or move where it's pointed, but still possible to update contact information.