But sorry, just can't seriously take it on faith that your product is going to last 11 centuries at 20C.
By the time it gets to the marketplace nobody knows anything and we're all acting like the monkeys in the story with banana and the ice-water spray.
I reported the issue and the systems architect waved it off arguing that his analysis of the supplier data had proven that the MTBF for this component was over 500 thousand hours.
Few months later, a task force was established by the project management to look for an alternate supplier for this component after it became obvious that its failure rate was significantly higher than advertised.
It is entirely possible that this is a success story of a lower-level engineer raising an issue that the higher levels then addressed.
Just because no one immediately jumps and say "by golly, we have to get rid of component X right now!" doesn't mean that the issue didn't begin percolating vertically and horizontally, ultimately resulting in a large-scale corrective effort.
Then I did not take the high road. The guy was very obnoxious and I had other issues to address. So I let it slide to maintain my "this is important" quota for other matters.
And a couple of months later, when some units failed on the test aircrafts (I insist on the fact that this was not a critical system), I had an issue report showing that the issue was observed during supplier-side tests and then ignored.
Take a regular ceramic resistor. I'd bet that if you kept it in a temperature controlled sealed box, it would last 2000 years.
I would possibly even reckon it might last 200,000 years.
Ceramics are so so so inert, and as are metals as long as they're away from oxygen.
In the case of MCAS, from what we have read so far, it seems this analysis was biased toward a non-catastrophic outcome (e.g. manageable through pilot action). This may explain why the statistical failure of a single computer was deemed sufficient. Now, assessors have upped the stakes, and the stats do not work anymore.
This indeed reveals a very serious problem in the RAMS process at Boeing, and exceed the scope of a « simple » software fix.
Yeah, I have a real problem with that.
A priori of a computer failure, you may have statistical reliability. But once it actually fails, the failure rate is 100% and a backup computer is needed.
Also, external AoA sensors fail all the time (like when a bird hits them), so the failure probability is very high. So we're not just talking about solid-state computer reliability here.
What also concerns me is that airliners fly at transsonic speeds. How would the AoA calculations be affected when the airplane is in a slip for some reason, and the AoA sensors are reading different values? What happens when MCAS goes berserk at high speeds (ie. near Mach 1.)
If MCAS wasn't even tested on takeoff, it sure as hell wasn't tested at Mach 0.8.
If the stakes are not clear ... besides the loss of life, an airliner crash often results in the bankruptcy of the entire carrier.
Source: commercially-rated airplane pilot who's studied high-speed aerodynamics.