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Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by whymauri on Friday August 02, 2019 @02:08AM (#20590934)
The highest bidder pays the second highest bid. Generalized, the k-th highest bidder pays the (k-1)-th bid for some k-th item.

It enforces truthful bidding and is revenue optimal. How is it needlessly complex?

Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by orijing on Friday August 02, 2019 @03:12AM (#20591160)
You're describing the generalized second price auction (GSP) which is NOT incentive compatible, which means the optimal strategy isn't to bid truthfully. VCG is.
Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by whymauri on Friday August 02, 2019 @03:52AM (#20591287)
You are correct. I wasn't very clear/am very tired.

That being said... GSP on one item is VCG, no?

Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by marcinzm on Friday August 02, 2019 @06:03AM (#20591784)
As I understand it, GSP on a single item is just a standard second price auction which is truthful.
Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by hdkrgr on Friday August 02, 2019 @06:12AM (#20591823)
That's correct.
Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by doctorpangloss on Friday August 02, 2019 @02:23AM (#20590980)
While revenue optimal, growth in retail is eventually driven by psychology, not pricing, since if there’s anything our real economy is good at producing, it’s morons.
Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by whymauri on Friday August 02, 2019 @02:24AM (#20590987)
That's the Bulow-Klemperer theorem. You would rather have more growth (bidders) at the expense of an optimal bidding mechanism.
Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by antpls on Friday August 02, 2019 @02:55AM (#20591096)
If actors are humans, then sure. But if actors are rational computers, and it's used billions time a day, you might prefer optimality.

Not saying this would be useful for communication between computers, but coming from CS degree, I have the intuition it could have some use cases.

Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by denormalfloat on Friday August 02, 2019 @02:43AM (#20591044)
It's needlessly complex because it doesn't solve any problems I have or any I have heard of. A simpler auction would still work pretty well, and be more easily understood by participants.

I ask because the only case I can think of this providing any value, it would be too complex. The example would be splitting up the assets after a divorce, where each spouse bids on the parts of the estate. A VCG auction may be more accurate, but what couple or lawyer would agree to use this system? It's too complex.

Re:Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Auction by zodiac on Friday August 02, 2019 @12:12PM (#20594146)
What "simpler auction system" would you propose?