Re:Work on production line of Boeing 737 Max ‘not adequately...
by mcv on Monday July 29, 2019 @10:15AM
(#20554792)
I think those individual actions only seem reasonable because we're so used to this corporate short-sightedness. People should be taking responsibility for the whole, and not just their little cog in the big machine.
For the 737 Max, moving the engines forward meant changing the aerodynamic balance. That alone should mean recertification, and every attempt to cover that up in order to save money, is part of the problem.
Re:Work on production line of Boeing 737 Max ‘not adequately...
by sokoloff on Monday July 29, 2019 @10:58AM
(#20555247)
The 737-700 is ~10 feet longer and ~20 foot wider wingspan than the -200. Surely that has a greater impact on aerodynamics than the -Max engine change. It’s not that there is no certification but rather that they are built on a common type certificate (and flown by a common type rating).
Everything that adds cost to aviation has a safety balance. Why do we allow 0 and 1 year olds to fly as lap children (without buying a seat)? Because displacing the fraction of families who would substitute a car trip if forced to buy more tickets would mean greater overall injuries and fatalities. Saving money has its own real safety benefit that needs to be balanced holistically.
The airplane needs more efficient engines.
The new engines are physically larger and the space underwing too low.
Let's move the engines forward.
That causes the stick force curve in an uncommon region of the envelope seen mostly only when hand flying and out of normal envelope.
We could fix the stick force curve by actively displacing the horizontal stabilizer under those conditions.
We can limit the authority of the stab under MCAS to 0.6°, a figure which would only be a slight hazard to flight as pilots could easily override.
We can prevent the need to retrain pilots (even if only differences training), but this requires us to use only a single angle-of-attack sensor to drive the system. That's OK, because the 0.6° limit is safe.
Later, someone else decides to give MCAS a little more control authority. It's not clear (to me) that the 0.6° prior limit was documented as something that was being relied on by regulators or not. A "safe" system being given a little more authority in the name of safety doesn't sound so bad, after all.
No analysis appears to be done for the case of multiply resetting the MCAS system, allowing for progressively more authority.
No analysis appears to be done for the fact that line pilots were relying on the "control breakaway" to interrupt automated trim motion on legacy 737s. Pilots using this undocumented technique may have become overly accustomed to it and assumed the plane was designed that way. Of course, MCAS, being a system to protect the stick force curve during manual flight, could not reasonably be disabled by a control column breakout switch, because it's designed to protect the aircraft exactly during hand flying situations where the pilot had the column in an aircraft nose up attitude (where the column breakout switches would be activated).
I agree with your overall point that the holistic outcome was bad, that it's a systems problem, but want to amplify the fact that a great many people were working diligently to accomplish their goal(s) in the face of their constraints. Very few (to perhaps none of them), pilots included, likely realized that they were acting in a short-sighted way.