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Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by daxterspeed on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @06:20PM (#20349511)
The downloads folder is a perfect target actually. Lots of documents end up downloaded as pdfs, I certainly have enough documents to dox me. Anyone who does their e-mailing through a browser will most likely have a bunch of exciting attachments in their downloads folder.

You'll probably also find a bunch of installers in the downloads folder, I could imagine a sophisticated attacker looking for installer .msi's or .exe's for software which is known to have vulnerability.

Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by ChrisSD on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @06:25PM (#20349547)
Sure but you can get much more if you use a more exploitable file type in the first place. Why would you willing jump back into a browser's sandbox when you've just persuaded the user to bypass it entirely?
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by Tiki on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @07:18PM (#20349974)
It's not so much why someone would choose this over that, as it is what attack vectors are added to which surface. Why wouldn't a bad actor be willing to jump back into a leaky sandbox?
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by ChrisSD on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @07:37PM (#20350115)
Because they already have the run of the user's profile. Why add additional complexity for less access?
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by Tiki on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @09:47PM (#20350826)
Because you may of had zero access rather than some, for example a web dev who wouldn't click on an .exe but would open an .html file without a second thought. More access isn't necessarily always the end goal either.
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by dejaime on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @11:14PM (#20351195)
If someone is knowledgeable enough to not open a shady exe file, they'll probably not simply open any shady files, including doc, ppt, and html
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by pas on Thursday July 04, 2019 @03:59AM (#20352530)
Nah, people are dumb (exhibit A: myself) and overly trusting of parsers/sandoxes.
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by posix_me_less on Thursday July 04, 2019 @04:07AM (#20352570)
Not true for html files. They are widely regarded as harmless.
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by dejaime on Wednesday July 17, 2019 @11:13AM (#20460313)
I have never seen anyone saying HTML files are harmless, and would definitely never say it myself.
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by zaarn on Thursday July 04, 2019 @06:05AM (#20353147)
Easy solution: Firefox gets two sandbox modes for file://;

If the directory is a subdirectory or top level to the default Download Directory or a recent "Save To.." location then the file will be sandboxed like in Chrome and show a warning.

If outside any such directories, it works as normal.

Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by floatingatoll on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @08:21PM (#20350388)
Does the vulnerability permit access to a directory index, in order to identify the filenames of exciting attachments to transmit?
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by ayosec on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @10:09PM (#20350909)
Apparently not. You can create a test.html file with the following content:

    <script>
      fetch(".").then(r => console.log(r));
      fetch("/").then(r => console.log(r));
    </script>
The console show errors when these URLs are loaded:

    TypeError: NetworkError when attempting to fetch resource. test.html:2:1
Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by regecks on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @06:39PM (#20349634)
Yeah. The Downloads directory inevitably accumulates sensitive data over time, especially lacking automatic cleanup/expiration of files. For this reason alone, Firefox should follow the Chromium/Edge policy.

Running Firefox via snapcraft, I've come to realize that desktop Linux systems keep moving the problem around without fully solving it (though I'm quite grateful for the real security benefits of snaps).

Traditional users/permissions are ineffective because all your important data is readable by your ostensibly unprivileged user.

Then SELinux/AppArmor enforcement comes along, but it's of limited effectiveness because you end up with free-for-alls (for convenience's sake) like ~/Downloads.

Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by yakubin on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @07:11PM (#20349910)
I think SELinux/AppArmor is a good idea for services like web/ftp/irc/ssh servers, wayland compositors, notification daemons (like dunst), external devices managment daemons (like udiskie) etc. But it isn't a good solution for applications which a user could try to use to read or change arbitrary things in the system for no malicious reasons. But, as I understand it, the Flatpak model of having the application sandboxed and then only allowing it to access files which are selected by the user in the GTK dialog is a great solution. It's just that I haven't seen one for command line applications. E.g. how should we protect ourselves from someone exploiting a vulnerability in vim to access our private documents, which we could potentially want to edit with vim ourselves?

EDIT: it seems there is some progress on making a Firefox Flatpak: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1441922

Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by dngray on Tuesday July 09, 2019 @11:47AM (#20392945)
> Yeah. The Downloads directory inevitably accumulates sensitive data over time, especially lacking automatic cleanup/expiration of files. For this reason alone, Firefox should follow the Chromium/Edge policy.

> Then SELinux/AppArmor enforcement comes along, but it's of limited effectiveness because you end up with free-for-alls (for convenience's sake) like ~/Downloads.

I keep this clean when I am finished with a file I usually have a term up and will move it to somewhere in ~/ or ~/Documents

I think I might use AppAmor to secure this like TAILS does https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/application_isolati...

I found these profiles which will act as a good basis https://github.com/mk-fg/apparmor-profiles/blob/master/profi... it seems that Mike Kazantsev (mk-fg) has abstracted it it a bit more into other files.

The ones that come with apparmor look ancient https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/blob/master/profiles/ap...

> E.g. how should we protect ourselves from someone exploiting a vulnerability in vim to access our private documents, which we could potentially want to edit with vim ourselves?

I think for me it would be about starting with high risk applications.

If you look at https://github.com/mk-fg/apparmor-profiles/tree/master/profi... you notice things like steam, skype, etc.