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Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by yakubin on Wednesday July 03, 2019 @07:11PM (#20349910)
I think SELinux/AppArmor is a good idea for services like web/ftp/irc/ssh servers, wayland compositors, notification daemons (like dunst), external devices managment daemons (like udiskie) etc. But it isn't a good solution for applications which a user could try to use to read or change arbitrary things in the system for no malicious reasons. But, as I understand it, the Flatpak model of having the application sandboxed and then only allowing it to access files which are selected by the user in the GTK dialog is a great solution. It's just that I haven't seen one for command line applications. E.g. how should we protect ourselves from someone exploiting a vulnerability in vim to access our private documents, which we could potentially want to edit with vim ourselves?

EDIT: it seems there is some progress on making a Firefox Flatpak: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1441922

Re:Firefox Local Files Theft – Not Patched Yet by dngray on Tuesday July 09, 2019 @11:47AM (#20392945)
> Yeah. The Downloads directory inevitably accumulates sensitive data over time, especially lacking automatic cleanup/expiration of files. For this reason alone, Firefox should follow the Chromium/Edge policy.

> Then SELinux/AppArmor enforcement comes along, but it's of limited effectiveness because you end up with free-for-alls (for convenience's sake) like ~/Downloads.

I keep this clean when I am finished with a file I usually have a term up and will move it to somewhere in ~/ or ~/Documents

I think I might use AppAmor to secure this like TAILS does https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/application_isolati...

I found these profiles which will act as a good basis https://github.com/mk-fg/apparmor-profiles/blob/master/profi... it seems that Mike Kazantsev (mk-fg) has abstracted it it a bit more into other files.

The ones that come with apparmor look ancient https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/blob/master/profiles/ap...

> E.g. how should we protect ourselves from someone exploiting a vulnerability in vim to access our private documents, which we could potentially want to edit with vim ourselves?

I think for me it would be about starting with high risk applications.

If you look at https://github.com/mk-fg/apparmor-profiles/tree/master/profi... you notice things like steam, skype, etc.