The German army was not particularly mechanised or well equipped as a whole, relying on a lot of horse draw vehicles for the entire war.
When you look at the war from a manufacturing perspective, the question is more about how Germany survived for so long again it’s such huge manufacturing nations. For a seemingly dry subject, David Edgerton’s book on this is very readable. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/mar/27/britains-war-m...
It's also worth point out that Germany suffered from a severe lack of resources, particularly oil and rubber (although everyone in WWII was short on rubber). While they did have synthetic fuel and rubber plants that they made excellent use of (part of the reason for German superiority in the chemical industry was their need for it), these synthetic routes are not really sustainable for a massive war effort, and Germany ran out of their stockpiled reserves by 1942. Case Blue, the second offensive in the USSR, had obtaining the Baku oil fields as its main objective.
Aircraft (especially fighters) have the same three requirements: until the ME-262 was deployed, Germany was only on par with the allies.
Artillery? Other than the feared 88mm, its artillery was clearly second fiddle to the Allies.
What enabled Germany to have any success was the initial training of its NCOs and officer corp. This allowed them to exploit opportunities faster than their opponents (think of Boyd's OODA cycle).
But all the oft-touted German "super-weapons" were usually over-engineered stuff that didn't work reliably. Note that the ME-109 flew until the end of the war since it was reliable, and effective against bombers until they were escorted by Mustangs and Thunderbolts.
They knew for example that they only had enough oil, with the limited mechanized forces they had, for operational effectiveness until autumn 1941. After that Germany would never again have the resources for grand operations on the strategic level of operation barbarossa. They needed to get to the oil fields of the Caucasus region which they did not even get close to due to some screwed up leadership decisions.
Fall blau was a pale comparison to the earlier operations and Germany's logistics system and resources were beyond tipping point.
And then when it came to Kursk all they could really manage was a single limited scope battle.
The Germans did (eventually) make some effort to obscure details of their supply chain--they forced manufacturers to use three-letter codes instead of their normal trademarks--but that still suffered from poor operational security which allowed the codes to be quickly matched up to manufacturers. It didn't help that the British analysts meticulously kept track of everything, allowing them to identify the manufacturer of one unlabelled part by the inspector's number.