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Re:SSH gets protection against side-channel attacks by jasonh3 on Friday June 21, 2019 @02:18PM (#20245029)
When I first saw this post, I got excited that someone had finally addressed the side channel from 17 years ago, which gathered inter-packet timing from ssh packets (and the fact that passwords are not echo'd) to a) detect when passwords were being typed, and b) use Hidden Markov Models to extract keystroke timing to try to extract the likely passwords.

There have been defenses proposed over the years, but none were accepted by OpenSSH AFAICT.

https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~vsekar/Teaching/Spring19/18731/re...

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2907598_Timing_Anal...

Re:SSH gets protection against side-channel attacks by wahern on Friday June 21, 2019 @03:16PM (#20245517)
The proper defense is to not use passwords. It's 2019, nobody should be using passwords on SSH-enabled shell accounts.

Heck, I use secure tokens for authentication so this memory encryption hack is useless to me--even I don't know what my private key(s) are, nor does OpenSSH or any other software on my computers. But I appreciate that we're a long way from ubiquitous hardware-based authentication.

Re:SSH gets protection against side-channel attacks by gnur on Friday June 21, 2019 @03:41PM (#20245708)
After you are connected you might still want to enter a password (for sudo perhaps).
Re:SSH gets protection against side-channel attacks by rphlx on Friday June 21, 2019 @06:43PM (#20246862)
The solution there is to have the app use line buffering rather than a "raw" term mode that exposes inter-char timing on the network. How widely that's followed in practice, I do not know, but one would certainly hope that sudo does it.
Re:SSH gets protection against side-channel attacks by rphlx on Friday June 21, 2019 @06:39PM (#20246847)
If you really cannot use keys, then one mitigation is to use copy/paste to paste the entire password instead of typing it one character at a time. That can open some copy/paste vulnerabilities e.g. in X11 where any app can then read the password until you copy something else in its place. And a network observer may still determine the password length. But it closes the inter-key timing channel that permits direct character recovery.