Re:SSH gets protection against side-channel attacks
by wahern on Friday June 21, 2019 @03:16PM
(#20245517)
The proper defense is to not use passwords. It's 2019, nobody should be using passwords on SSH-enabled shell accounts.
Heck, I use secure tokens for authentication so this memory encryption hack is useless to me--even I don't know what my private key(s) are, nor does OpenSSH or any other software on my computers. But I appreciate that we're a long way from ubiquitous hardware-based authentication.
Re:SSH gets protection against side-channel attacks
by gnur on Friday June 21, 2019 @03:41PM
(#20245708)
After you are connected you might still want to enter a password (for sudo perhaps).
Re:SSH gets protection against side-channel attacks
by rphlx on Friday June 21, 2019 @06:43PM
(#20246862)
The solution there is to have the app use line buffering rather than a "raw" term mode that exposes inter-char timing on the network. How widely that's followed in practice, I do not know, but one would certainly hope that sudo does it.
Re:SSH gets protection against side-channel attacks
by rphlx on Friday June 21, 2019 @06:39PM
(#20246847)
If you really cannot use keys, then one mitigation is to use copy/paste to paste the entire password instead of typing it one character at a time. That can open some copy/paste vulnerabilities e.g. in X11 where any app can then read the password until you copy something else in its place. And a network observer may still determine the password length. But it closes the inter-key timing channel that permits direct character recovery.
There have been defenses proposed over the years, but none were accepted by OpenSSH AFAICT.
https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~vsekar/Teaching/Spring19/18731/re...
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2907598_Timing_Anal...