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A comment on RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them. Parent comment

Re:RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessin... by the8472 on Tuesday June 11, 2019 @02:35PM (#20158221)
If this attack is a concern then so is rowhammer. So you can basically ask whether cloud providers have mitigated rowhammer.

AMD's SEV might help protecting VMs from each other.

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Re:RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessin... by expliced on Tuesday June 11, 2019 @02:48PM (#20158339)
>unlike Rowhammer, RAMBleed does not require persistent bit flips, and is thus effective against ECC memory commonly used by server computers.

Seems like mitigations for Rowhammer is not enough for RAMBleed.

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Re:RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessin... by opencl on Tuesday June 11, 2019 @03:56PM (#20158961)
SEV is a completely different thing than ECC. It encrypts the memory. RAMBleed reads raw physical bits which are encrypted and thus useless when SEV is enabled.

The paper even specifically says that SEV and other similar technologies protect against this.

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Re:RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessin... by syn0byte on Tuesday June 11, 2019 @03:32PM (#20158751)
ECC isn't effective mitigation against Rowhammer either.

https://www.vusec.net/projects/eccploit/

tl;dr ECC logic can't cope with 'single' errors involving > 2 bits.

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Re:RAMBleed Attack – Reading Bits in Memory Without Accessin... by Dylan16807 on Wednesday June 12, 2019 @12:46AM (#20161842)
It has to cause a huge amount of single-bit errors to find a spot suitable for a three-bit error.

If these errors are actually treated as errors, then chips will be disabled or processes will get blacklisted long before they can be used to exploit.

So this is really "ECC is often configured wrong", not "ECC isn't effective".

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