The clever cryptography behind Apple’s “Find My” feature

Re:The clever cryptography behind Apple’s “Find My” feature by rando444 on Saturday June 08, 2019 @07:51PM (#20135987)

Places like shopping malls use just your devices hardware ids to track your movements.

To me just the fact that these things are on when you ask for them to be off is problematic.

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Re:The clever cryptography behind Apple’s “Find My” feature by slig on Saturday June 08, 2019 @08:21PM (#20136122)

iOS does shuffle the MAC address in order to prevent this, doesn't it?

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Re:The clever cryptography behind Apple’s “Find My” feature by oflannabhra on Saturday June 08, 2019 @10:48PM (#20136742)

Yes, on top of this, applications don’t have access to a devices MAC address through CoreBluetooth, so they can’t fingerprint a device.

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Re:The clever cryptography behind Apple’s “Find My” feature by baybal2 on Sunday June 09, 2019 @02:04AM (#20137441)

You can shuffle your mac but not your gsm/3g ids broadcasted in the open as per spec.

I first saw this tech, I think, 9 years ago when I first encountered a "bluetooth spam" device

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Re:The clever cryptography behind Apple’s “Find My” feature by djchen on Saturday June 08, 2019 @08:32PM (#20136159)

Yes, except if you connect to their WiFi.

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