Maybe at first we could try an in-between solution. I hate to water things down but maybe a scheme like a USDA Prime Beef label[0] would be more likely to actually pull off?
If there was a NIST Certified logo on one bank/app/merchant/site that asks for personal info, and not another, I would be much more likely to go with the NIST one. Obviously credit agencies and gov systems need to go first.
>In the United States, the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) operates a voluntary beef grading program that began in 1917. A meat processor pays for a trained AMS meat grader to grade whole carcasses at the abattoir. Such processors are required to comply with Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) grade labeling procedures. The official USDA grade designation can appear as markings on retail containers, individual bags, or on USDA shield stamps, as well as on legible roller brands appearing on the meat itself.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beef_carcass_classification
This sounds nice, but I can't help but feel like this could end up being abused...somehow.
It's worth thinking about. It might also be worth considering if we think there's a good way to get there without doing more harm than good. Congress is not always known for their high-quality technical regulatory work.
Regulation would almost certainly lag at least a couple years behind and end up making software and IT maintenance much more expensive without making it that much more secure. I don’t think I like this idea, but imagine if marketers for more robust, secure IT solutions were legally allowed to show you how they can spy on you as a part of an ad. That opens up a huge can of worms that is probably best left closed, but I think it’d act like steroids for getting people to upgrade their insecure stuff.
The biggest issue IMO with the HIPAA SR is that it is first and foremost a legal matter that involves legal teams, and is not very good at being a technology matter that effectively prescribes security to security teams. Most of the HIPAA-motivated companies I worked with spent more effort getting their legal counsel to build a HIPAA litigation shield (via intercepting and carefully massaging the wording of security assessments) than they did getting their security teams to actually improve anything.
I did have some clients that saw HIPAA as only a foundation and guidelines for truly improving their security, but that was more a matter of the company actually caring about security, and not because the HIPAA security rule is actually effective.
The companies that were actually good at security merely used HIPAA as a starting point, and sometimes had to divert resources away from actual security efforts just to meet redundant HIPAA audits. They would just as easily get by with any of the other myriad of security frameworks out there.
The companies that were bad at security either: 1) mostly ignored HIPAA because in many cases it's easier to just buy insurance to cover the cost of a breach, 2) viewed HIPAA as a legal matter and got lawyers involved, who many times actively impeded security infrastructure efforts (fines are less for a HIPAA breach if you "weren't aware" you were doing anything wrong, which leads to companies intentionally avoiding security assessments or altering them to read "everything is fine!" even when they know it's not), or 3) viewed HIPAA as a checklist and once they achieve HIPAA compliance, they think their security is good enough and stop investing in it (hint: achieving HIPAA compliance does not mean you have good security. not even close).
I certainly do contend that HIPAA has not benefited the security of the healthcare industry as a whole. IME, it may have very well hurt it.
* - I'm speaking specifically of the HIPAA security rule and it's effect on organizations' security maturity. In other areas, like patient privacy and disclosure rules, it does seem to have had an effect closer to what is intended.
When all is said and done it's really the organization. I don't know how many bigcorps I've been at that were just totally inept. The existence or not of HIPAA would not change their ineptness.
If hospitals faced zero consequences for losing customer data, then yeah, things would probably be worse. But HIPPA is two things: a set of mandatory requirements and a grounds for suing hospitals that lose/misuse data. I think the latter thing is effective, but the former is not.
For example a sewage treatment plant dumping raw untreated sewage will get punished. However a city with a major homeless problem where many thousands poop on the street will not be punished for a larger release of untreated raw sewage.
Its kinda similar with major organizations and IT. If there's a policy with the correct checkboxes and strong sounding speeches and firmly worded emails were produced by executives, it doesn't matter if there's some individual unpatched Win95 machine running mission critical tasks, even if there's thousands of those supposedly isolated individual case systems.
>Telling a company "The government says you have to patch and is offering to do it for you" seems like it might not go over quite as well as you might hope.
I think a better idea is to have the new agency play an advisory / supplemental role but otherwise place the burden of fix on the company itself. It just needs teeth for entities unwilling to adequately resolve their IT failures.
The EPA will bring suit to companies polluting illegally. Why shouldn't a government agency bring suit to companies or cities risking a leak of hundreds of millions of social security numbers, for example?