If nobody has access to all three pieces of information, including the voter, how can they verify their own vote?
The voter, and only the voter, has access to all three pieces of information.
If they have access, so does someone trying to coerce them...
No, they don't. That's the point. The voter can lie about the salt. Only the voter knows they are lying, because they were alone in the polling booth.
Then how can they be sure their vote was counted correctly?
By comparing their private knowledge of 1) who they voted for and 2) the salt they were shown in the booth with 3) the public hash of the two.
In any case it was only meant as an existence proof, not a practical system. I like aeternus's suggestion much more, since it has the useful property that everyone can see all the votes - just not whose is whose. (Although I'm not sure what function the receipt serves)
Now, the issue becomes obvious - if someone can falsify votes, why can't they falsify salts as well? Less obviously, this is true of any verification system - abstractly, you can always count the vote one way, and "verify" it the other way. So what you have to do is have completely different possession chains for the vote roll and the salt roll. Make it so that at no point does any one person have access to all three of 1) the voter id, 2) the vote cast, and 3) the salt. This means that nobody has the required information, or access, to undetectably falsify a vote.
Extending this to handle more than two options, and making it easy enough to comprehend that the average voter won't get caught out if they try to lie, is left as an exercise for the reader. But it's possible.