AF447 is fascinating for other reasons as well - on Airbus it is possible for two pilots to provide directly opposite control inputs because there is no mechanical linkage between the sidesticks, unlike on yokes in most other airplanes. It does produce a warning (dual input) but it is not tactile - you cannot feel what the other crew member is doing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armavia_Flight_967 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia_AirAsia_Flight_8501 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8F5bRxTIn24

A pretty extreme UX issue.

It seems a bit rough that you're getting downvotes. [Edit: The parent was grey when I wrote this].

AF447 seems like a pretty important case study for figuring out where to put the balance of trust. Along with the very final stage of Aeroflot 593 (after the child had left the seat), also mentioned.

There's a few more: Colgan Air 3407, AirAsia 8501, Korean 501, etc, where flight crew ignored or overrode systems. Which is not to deny that in the majority of cases the flight crew are the best judge of what is needed, just that one surely has to look critically and honestly at counter examples.

There is of course also Germanwings 9525, though as the GP implies, systems protecting against malicious piloting will probably be counter-productive.

I liked the part where it would turn off the stall warning when the nose was too high, then turn them back on again when the nose dropped, which may have convinced the copilot that holding the stick back was helping.