You have a strange idea about how to assess risk. It's like faults are somehow contagious.
They are. If 737 MAX was rushed to market and this is the first issue we become aware of, how many more are hidden?
If Boeing makes a habit of rushing planes to market without certification, how many more ticking time-bombs are flying around?
There’s no question that Boeing’s implementation had major issues, but there is IMO a higher burden of argument(?) to declare that a fundamental inevitability.
This could simply be a case of Boeing incompetent/reckless/...
Aviation adapts to problems and it always has. Southwest installed additional gear on their planes to help prevent this when the first plane crashed. It’s not far fetched that companies in countries with lesser regulations might skip out on training or plane enhancements that would lessen the chances of this problem.
Clearly, that didn't happen, or a second MAX wouldn't have crashed under very similar circumstances.
> Southwest installed additional gear on their planes to help prevent this when the first plane crashed.
Southwest ordered the MAX with an AoA indicator; it wasn't retrofitted.
> ... to help prevent this ...
It's questionable whether the AoA indicator would've made a difference. However, an AoA disagree alert that is standard in the previous 737 gen was "accidentally" made part of the AoA indicator extra feature set on the MAX, and the AoA disagree just _might_ have made a difference. [1]
> It’s not far fetched that companies in countries with lesser regulations might skip out on training or plane enhancements that would lessen the chances of this problem.
An AoA indicator is not mandatory anywhere in the world.
[1] https://www.aviationtoday.com/2019/05/06/boeing-angle-of-att...
If you make controls more complicated, pilots will make more mistakes in critical situation.
your parenthetical still shows some finger pointing towards “poor” countries’ pilots and ignores the number of crashes and reports for as young as this plane is and the numbers in use.