So I would never put anything more than mildly sensitive on Dropbox unless I could encrypt it locally at each computer I use before I sent it too them. Yes, I guess it would be somewhat better than the current situation if they encrypted it on their system using a key I sent every times I wanted a file, but I'd still be trusting them to properly destroy the key, etc.
By that logic, you should also not trust the guy who makes your next carry out. You don't know him after all. For all you know he could be some evil guy who likes to spit in the customers' orders.
On the other hand, if you had very sensitive financial or business info on Dropbox, then the consequences are much much more akin to having your food poisoned. So then you're question becomes: why aren't I afraid of being poisoned by my take out? And the answer is that (1) nobody stands to gain from me being poisoned while they do stand to gain from stealing my financial info, and (2) the perceived seriousness of poisoning means that many more resources are put into finding and punishing people who poison (per incident) than people who steal financial data, so people are strongly discouraged from the former.
I don't know what Dropbox does, but it is possible to encrypt all data with a random session key, and then encrypt that session key with a password. Then a change of password simply needs the stored encrypt session key to be replaced. This is what LUKS does, for example.
As a general rule you shouldn't trust a third party with the security or encryption of your very sensitive files but encrypt those files yourself before they go into dropbox (or other services).
I have some pretty low risk files in my Dropbox but I still encrypted them with a long complex password with 256-bit AES encryption through WinZIP. I've heard GnuPG is better as it allows asymmetric encryption, but this should be good enough.
Basically trust Dropbox about as much as you trust email, if it matters encrypt it locally
I'm sorry, but I don't follow.
For all bit-identical copies of a file, the secure hash will be the same. For all copies of that file encrypted with the same symmetric encryption key, the same property holds. Encrypt it with AES-256 using a shared key, and all users can still take advantage of the LAN copies and de-duping that Dropbox supports for unencrypted files.
Now, if you want full asymmetric (RSA, PGP, whatever) encryption of files with per-user keys and fast LAN copies/de-dupling of the plaintext version, you're of course out of luck. That's not a failing of Dropbox, though; the same would be true of any NAS solution, locally-hosted or not.
If you can detect that two files encrypted with different secure keys are the same then you are similarly screwed.
On the user's account you would then store a list with keys for each file. Before this list is stored or updated on the server, it is encrypted on the client-side with the user's password, so that the server cannot retrieve this information.
Of course, the security with such a scheme is somewhat lower than with "traditional" encryption, as you can find out who shares a given file. But the advantage of this is that you are still able to block particular files, if, e.g., required to do so by law.
That doesn't require that a server know the key; it only requires that those parties exchange a shared key in advance. It's no different than, i.e., a PSK WPA network password, or a shared encryption key on a workgroup document.
You could still use a service like Dropbox as a reliable offsite backup, while doing all your crypto locally. Think of it as the "availability" service to complement your local policies that insure integrity and confidentiality.
The problem is that Dropbox can't offer seamless encryption while still having lazy file sharing.
If you want a similar system with better encryption look at Wuala or SpiderOak.
As I understand it (and perhaps I'm wrong), your dropbox password is not your encryption key. The fact that I can change my password and then still have instant access to all of my data (ie - it is not batch re-encrypted with new key) all but confirms this, correct? If that's the case, then it implies that, somewhere on their servers, they store an encryption key for each user (or gasp a single encryption key for all users).
If that's the case and someone is able to access those keys (employee, breakin, etc.), then they can decrypt the data for any user.
If this is all true, then this makes the service too risky (for me) for anything that could be considered medium to high security. I'd prefer it if the good folks at dropbox offer me the option to provide my own encryption key that is only known to me and is provided by me each time I want to gain access to the dropbox files.