They were the only ones, who really knew the inside details and they were the only ones to know how to (possibly) fix it before a lot more people had to day.
Instead of being completely fortright and transparent they published an apparently completely worthless checklist. And all in the name of greed and corporate profit.
That they still smear the pilots and throw them under the bus despite all the facts that came to light leaves me speechless.
The conclusion is most charitably described as fanciful. There are strict rules about an automated system being able to apply more "authority" than the pilot can counter, which every engineer and manager involved knew well.
There are strict rules about a single sensor failure that can make the plane unflyable, which all knew well.
This is not a case of simple negligence to check documentation. This is a case of deliberate coverup of known risk factors to dodge rules specifically intended for airframe changes of this kind.
It was the process of dodging these rules which kept the MCAS design from being reviewed competently.
[1] https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/a-lac...
I don't see why Boeing would pay to have this published.
It would probably take either an inquiry like those into the space shuttle accidents, or a whistleblower, to know whether anyone was raising concerns. I can believe it is possible that everyone was convinced by the "in the worst case, it is no worse than ordinary trim runaway" argument (which does not excuse the failure to meet the redundancy requirement), but then the Ethiopian Airlines crash, and its crew's inability to manually re-trim, might raise the question of whether trim runaway on any 737 model is more of a risk than had been supposed (to be fair, trim runaway has not caused 737 crashes in the past, AFAIK.)