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Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by Cacti on Thursday April 18, 2019 @08:26PM (#19696012)
The airlines knew what they were doing when they didn’t pay for the “upgrade” and they doubly knew when they didn’t pay for it after the first crash. Airline management is just as culpable in this debacle.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by InclinedPlane on Thursday April 18, 2019 @11:33PM (#19696901)
This is bonkers. Nobody anywhere in the world should expect that one buys an airplane which is unsafe by design. Also, the idea that there are two versions of a plane, one that kills people and one that doesn't, and if you buy the wrong one that's completely your fault is just insane.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by Cacti on Friday April 19, 2019 @09:30PM (#19704306)
Frankly, you have no idea what you're talking about. This is how the airline industry works. Airlines WANT cheap planes and they ARE WILLING to and DO skimp on some safety features to save money. Airlines WANT safety features, at least some of them, to be optional so that they aren't forced to spend money on them if they don't want them.

For example, backup fire extinguishers in the cockpit? Optional. Extra oxygen masks? Optional. Advanced radar? Optional. There are hundreds of items like this on every model, whether it's Boeing or Airbus or someone else, because their customers WANT them to be optional.

And by the way, not all airlines do this. American paid for the upgrades. Southwest paid for the upgrades.

So maybe you should ask yourself why it is that Lion Air and Ethiopian Air were willing to spend huge amounts of money on a new jet, then spend some $1-$2 million on optional upgrades, and yet not include the MCAS upgrade in those options (and they were made well aware of it, as you can see from other airliners purchase of these upgrades). Or for that matter maybe you should ask why Lion Air knew that the plane was having trouble with the AoA sensors for several flights prior to the crash, and yet did not perform the required maintenance on them (a serious violation) and did not pass along information to its next crews (also a serious violation), who were caught completely unaware.

Airlines run at 2, 3% margin, and they do so by trimming costs at every possible area. Sometimes those areas are safety related. Airlines are not some doe-eyed naive little up who just trust whatever Big Boeing/Airbus tells them. They know how the planes work, they have their own pilots, they have their own engineering teams, they have their own specialists and experts, and they make decisions to sacrifice safety for savings, and they do it ALL THE TIME.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by InclinedPlane on Saturday April 20, 2019 @03:28AM (#19705271)
There's plenty I could say in answer to this but most of it is unnecessary.

There is no excuse for a company such as Boeing, working under the regulation of the FAA, to produce any version of any model of plane which is fundamentally unsafe to fly. Period. None.

We're done here.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by Cacti on Saturday April 20, 2019 @08:43AM (#19706235)
Life must be great in black and white.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ReGenGen on Friday April 19, 2019 @01:01AM (#19697212)
The 80K upgrade was simply a AOA disagree warning light and has zero affect on MCAS behavior. There is no evidence that airlines were told about MCAS until the Lion Air accident.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by ncmncm on Thursday April 18, 2019 @09:24PM (#19696281)
There is more than enough blame to go around. E.g., Congress, for the last N decades, failing to fund FAA at levels clearly needed.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by schraeds on Friday April 19, 2019 @01:13AM (#19697254)
Beyond funding is the issue of regulatory capture. The FAA is too cozy with the plane manufacturers, allowing them to help test,certify,document their own products.

The biggest overarching change I would like to see is the abandonment of allowing manufacturers to extend the type rating of airframes indefinitely and designing to avoid costly recertification and training vs a true focus on safety and innovation.

Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by kadendogthing on Thursday April 18, 2019 @09:03PM (#19696191)
Yeah, they willingly bought these planes. Airlines should be held as equable responsible.
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by bronson on Friday April 19, 2019 @12:13AM (#19697051)
You’re saying that Boeing intentionally sold unsafe airplanes? And the airlines, knowing this, still bought them?
Re:How the Boeing 737 Max disaster looks to a software Devel... by kadendogthing on Friday April 19, 2019 @09:44AM (#19699525)
I'm giving money to the airlines. Not Boeing.

>You’re saying that Boeing intentionally sold unsafe airplanes?

Yes.

>And the airlines, knowing this

You know airlines have their own engineering teams, right? And they were bought explicitly to save money.